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PART I LEGAL NATURE OF LOANS 
1 
LEGAL NATURE OF LOANS 
Our law recognises two types of loans, namely a loan for use (commodatum) and 
a loan for consumption (mutuum)'. 
In a loan for use something is delivered for use by a borrower without 
reward, and the borrower is obliged to return the same thing he received on 
loan. For example, a person may lend another person an asset of his, and 
when the recipient has finished using that asset the identical asset in the 
same condition as received, is to be returned to the lender. 
In a loan for consumption one or more units of some fungible thing are 
delivered to the borrower. The borrower may consume what has been received 
but is bound to return the same number of units of the type of the thing 
borrowed. 
In constrasting a commodatum with a mutuum, it can be seen that a lender ·in 
the first instance retains ownership of the asset loaned, whereas in the 
second, ownership is passed to the borrower, who undertakes to repay the loan 
by delivering things of an identical quality and quantity as those borrowed. 
Thus, an essential characteristic of a loan of money is that the lender is 
either the owner of the funds advanced, or is authorised to make the loan by 
the owner. Once delivery has taken place to the borrower a contract can 
probably be said to be binding. 
2 
Thus, a contract of loan cannot be said to be binding by part performance as, 
in mutuum the only person bound is the person who received a service by the 
handing over of the money in question. 
Thus, the lender must not only transfer possesion, but also title in the 
things lent so that the borrower is legally entitled to consume them. At 
this stage, the borrower will become the owner of the things lent, and will 
thereafter carry the risk for any loss or deterioration of the things lent 
and similarly be entitled to consume or alienate them. At this stage, 
ownership of the fungibles passes either because they are consumed, or the 
identity is lost through confusio (that is, the mixing of the moneys received 
with the borrower's own funds). 
Possesion and title can be transferred in a number of ways. This could be 
effected by actual delivery where the lender either delivers the moneys lent 
to the borrower, or instruct the borrower to collect the things from him; 
alternatively, the lender may instruct a third party to hand them over to the 
borrower where that third party has in its possession the funds to be 
advanced (a bank for example). Alternatively, the lender may permit the 
borrower to retain for its own use things which the borrower was otherwise 
obliged to deliver to the lender, or funds due to the lender as a result of 
the borrower, pursuant to the lender's ins true tions, selling something which 
previously belonged to the lender and thereby retaining the proceeds received 
as a loan for consumption. 
Once the borrower has received the moneys lent, it is under a duty to return 
to the lender things of the same kind, quantity and quality as those which 
were lent. He may also return the actual asset advanced but in the case of 
-■ 
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moneys lent, this is unlikely to occur. The loan should be repaid in the 
.. currency advanced, unless the contract proves otherwise. 
If the borrower does not return the things as required, at the required time 
and place the borrower commits a breach of contract. The lender can 
therefore institute a claim for due performance of the contract and the court 
will order the borrower to return the sum lent. 
To this end, the contract of loan will probably lay down a fixed or 
determinable future time for the return of moneys advanced. Where this 
provision is so vague as to be unintelligible, the term of the loan may be 
void for vagueness and the agreement should be considered as one without any 
time clause. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no limitation of the right 
of the lender to reclaim the loan immediately, but fairness demands that the 
borrower be given a period of grace and be entitled to a reasonable time 
before he can be compelled to repay moneys borrowed. 
In the event of the borrower commiting a breach of contract, the lender will 
have a personal right against that borrower to claim damages suffered. The 
quantum of the damages claimed will be based on amounts due to the lender in 
terms of the contract, together with any interest which is due. 
In terms of the common law, a mutuwn did not generally carry a provision for 
reward (interest). Thus, the provision that interest be paid needs to be 
stipulated. Thus, an agreement of loan would be coupled with a stipulatio 
for return and where the contract is so reinforced it will be superceded by 
the stipulatio. Where there is a stipulatio that interest be paid, this may 
be agreed expressly or impliedly and thus the borrower will remunerate the 
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lender by paying interest on moneys advanced. At common law this interest 
is usually expressed as a percentage of the money lent and is calculated for 
a fixed period or from the time of receipt until the loan is repaid. 
However, as soon as the debtor falls into mora he becomes liable to pay 
damages for the default in the form of interest, as calculated from the time 
of default. The rate of interest applicable will depend on the circumstances 
of the case. In the absence of any agreement concerning the rate at which 
interest is to be paid, the court will award interest as provided by law. 
The above legal principles have been fully accepted and applied by the South 
African tax courts when considering cases concerning losses by lenders on 
moneys advanced in return for interest. 
The rights of a lender claiming damages, have not, however, necessarily, been 
considered with strict reference to the legal nature of the rights, but the 
courts have often considered the commercial reality of such a transaction. 
However, the underlying rationale of the transaction has always been 
important to the courts in reaching the conclusions discussed herein. 
- -
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LOSSES ARISING FROM LOANS ADVANCED 
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
-
The deductibility of a loss incurred on a loan or advance made to a 
third party by a taxpayer, where that third party has failed to repay 
fully or partially a debt, is, as is the case with most other forms of 
expenditure, subject to the "general deduction formula", being Section 
ll(a), as read with Section 23(g) (Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Comoany Limited v CIR 1). 
Section ll(a) provides for the deduction of: 
"Expenditure and losses actually incurred in the Republic in the 
production of the income, provided such expenditure and losses 
are not of a capital nature". 
Section 23(g) provides that: 
"No deduction shall in any case be made in respect of the 
following matters, namely: 
(g) Any monies claimed as a deduction from income derived from 
trade which are not wholly or exclusively laid out or 
expended for the purposes of trade". 
TT_.._ ,C,¥ftS &® M* u MA llllllil■■ ■ _QlfllWWWW,._,._• 
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I 6 The general deduction formula comprising by the above two sub-sections 
can be broken down into the following parts: 
o The expenditure and losses; 
o Must be actually incurred; 
o In the Republic; 
o During the year of assessment; 
o In the production of income; 
o They must not constitute expenditure and losses of a capital 
nature; and 
o They must constitute monies that are wholly or exclusively laid 
out or expended for the purposes of trade. 
(Silke on South African Income Tax 2) 
Although the deduction of losses incurred as a result third parties 
failing to repay debts due to a taxpayer are subject to the general 
deduction formula as outlined above, the nature of the loss so 
incurred is, in many respects, different to that of more accepted 
forms of expenditure and losses. To this end, the following 
distinguishing features can be identified: 
o Loans are advanced by a taxpayer for periods, both short and 
long. Thus, the precise time at which a loss is incurred is not 
always readily ascertainable. On the other hand, where an item 
of expenditure is incurred, there is clearly a parting of an 
asset (together with the reciprocal quid pro quo); whilst losses 
incurred as a result of fire, theft and the like are similarly 











In the case of a loan advanced, the taxpayer does not part with 
an asset. Although it advances finance to a third party, it 
simultaneously receives a reciprocal right to receive repayment 
of an identical amount advanced, plus the reward for so 
advancing the amount. Thus the nature of the taxpayer's capital 
merely changes form from cash to a right. 
case 3 'Watermeyer CJ stated: 
In Lever Brother's 
"In the case of a loan of money the lender gives the money 
to the borrower, who in return incurs an obligation to 
repay the same amount of money at some future time and if 
the loan is one which bears interest, he also incurs an 
obligation to pay that interest. Though I use the words 
'gives the money' this must not be taken literally as the 
usual way of making a loan. As a rule, the lender either 
gives credit to the borrower ... in return for which the 
lender pays him interest ... " 
Conversely, in the case of expenditure incurred, a taxpayer 
would clearly have parted with an asset (being the funds 
expended) when obtaining the right attached to the expenditure, 
or in the case of loss through fire or theft an asset would have 
disappeared, rather than a simple decline in the value of a 
right of recourse. 
o A lender looks for a return in the form of interest, or similar 
payment, which is indistinguishable from the nature of the asset 
(being his money) advanced. The distinguishing feature between 
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interest and capital is frequently achieved by agreement, 
wherein a loan agreement stipulates payments to be made by the 
borrower, and the form of the payments, being interest and 
capital. 
On the other hand, expenditure incurred in acquiring an asset or 
a service generally results in a return in another form. For 
example, expenditure on trading stock results in a taxpayer's 
money being converted into trading stock, which trading stock is 
again converted into money. The incremental value earned by the 
taxpayer is the difference between the cost of the trading stock 
and the proceeds received on its subsequent sale. 
The significance of the above is that there is a clear and 
distinct break between the application of a taxpayer's capital 
in acquiring the trading stock, and the return generated by the 
trading stock. In the case of loans advanced where there is·no 
such break, there is a connection between capital invested and 
lost which could be viewed as being so directly linked to the 
capital advanced, that the loan itself retains its capital 
nature, subject to the specific factors surrounding the 
transaction; 
o It would further appear that losses incurred of the nature 
envisaged have been discussed within the ambit of the general 
provisions of the Income Tax Act as no specific provisions 
apply. Thus, the courts have been required to look at the 
nature of a transaction which does not, it is considered, fall 
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directly within the ambit of transactions envisaged by the Act, 
and apply these principles to the specifics. Such an approach 
has tended to result in a taxpayer being required to show more 
clearly, it would appear, a change of intention than would be 
required for other forms of business, such as the investment in 
trading stock, for example. 
Throughout the course of this analysis, it has been assumed that the 
consequences of an irrecoverable loan are properly referred to as a 
"loss". In Joffe and Company's case 4 Watermeyer CJ discussed a loss 
thus: 
"The word 'loss' has several meanings and its meaning in Section 
11 (2) (a) (Section 11 (a) in the Income Tax Act currently in 
force) is somewhat obscure. In relation to trading operations 
the word is sometimes used to signify a deprivation suffered by 
the loser, usually an involuntarily deprivation, whereas 
expenditure usually means a voluntary payment of money." 
Thus, an amount advanced to a third party as a loan is clearly 
advanced on the premise that it will be returned; the resultant 
failure to honour such a commitment is clearly "an involuntarily 
deprivation" and is thus a loss, as opposed to expenditure. Further, 
the term "expenditure", as discussed above, means a voluntary payment. 
As previously discussed 3 , a loan does not, itself, constitute a 





The above assumption that a "loss" arises would appear to be common to 
the interpretation placed on an irrecoverable loan by the courts. In 
Solaglass' case 5 the issue was stated thus: 
"The monies claimed as deductions represent ... the capital lost 
by appellant as a result of the loans becoming irrecoverable." 
In reviewing claims made by taxpayers wherein deductions have been 
claimed for losses incurred as a result of loans and advances made 
becoming irrecoverable, the courts have emphasized that the key 
consideration in assessing such a claim is determining whether or not 
the loan so made was of a capital or revenue nature. In the event of 
such a loan being of a capital nature, then the loss so incurred would 
fail to meet one of the above criteria, and would therefore be 
disallowed as a deduction. In addition, the courts have also 
emphasized that the loan so advanced must have been advanced in the 
course of the taxpayer's trade; thus, where a loan was not advanced 
during the course of, or as adjunct to, the trade in question, it 
would similarly fail to meet one of the criteria outlined above and 
could not therefore rank as a deduction. 
On the question of whether or not a loss has been incurred, the courts 
have tended to look at the commercial reality of such a transaction, 
rather than its strict legal nature, in assessing the taxpayer's claim 
that a loss has actually been incurred. (See ITC 1324 43 SATC 47 at 
Although not directly addressed in cases reviewed, it would appear 
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that the courts have generally looked at the manner in which a loan or 
advance was funded when determining the income tax characteristics of 
the right (being the loan) actually acquired; on the other hand the 
nature of the right acquired has, at times, been a relevant factor. 
Thus, the emphasis of the courts has been to examine from whence the 
funds advanced were derived, rather than the use to which they were 
put. For example, in ITC 257 6 the taxpayer made loans by way of 
promissory notes on which he suffered a loss. Even though the notes 
were converted to cash and reinvested in a similar manner for similar 
periods, Dr Manfred Nathan KC stated, at 66: 
"It is true that the period for which money is invested is four 
months, but sometimes these monies are irrecoverable by the 
lender and so far as he is concerned, they are for that time 
frozen capital; he cannot deal with the capital in anyway; it 
does not differ from the monies paid out for stock in an 
ordinary mercantile business." 
Thus, where money was invested in the form of a promissory note, 
rather than a tangible asset in the form of trading stock being 
acquired, the courts failed to accept the distinction between the 
promissory note and trading stock, and looked solely at the method in 
which this right was funded when concluding that the loss was of a 
capital nature. Similar approaches were adopted by the courts in 
Salisbury Board of Executors Limited ,v COT, (SR) 12 SATC 1, where at 
10 the courts found that the fact that the company had lent a portion 




The critical enquiry into the question of whether a loss incurred as 
a result of a loan or advance being irrecoverable would therefore 
appear to require an examination into the nature in which it was 
funded, and the nature those funds assumed in the taxpayer's hands. 
Stemming from this enquiry would be an examination into the business 
of the taxpayer, and whether or not losses so incurred were on a 
revenue account. 
CAPITAL NATURE 
In both accounting, and legal parlance, the cash resources of a 
taxpayer are commonly regarded as that taxpayer's capital. In 
discussing the different categories of capital, Innes CJ in CIR v 
George Forest Timber Company Limited 1 SATC 20 at 23 stated: 
"Capital, it should be remembered might be either fixed or 
floating. The substantial difference was that floating capital 
was consumed disappeared in the very process of production, 
while fixed capital did not; though it produced fresh wealth and 
it remained intact ... Ordinary merchandise in the hands of a 
trader would be floating capital. Its use involved its 
disappearance and the money obtained for it was received as a 
part of the ordinary revenue of the business. It could never 
have been intended that the money received by a merchant in the 
course and as a result of his trading should not form part of 
his gross income. The proceeds of fixed capital stood in a 
• 
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different position. The sale of such capital would generally 
speaking represent a mere realisation which ought from its 
nature to be excluded, and which this section intended to 
exclude from the calculation of income.n 
In applying the above principle, it is apparent that an important 
enquiry into whether losses made on loan transactions are of a capital 
nature, is to ascertain whether or not the loss was a loss of fixed or 
floating capital. In Stone v SIR 36 SATC 117, where the taxpayer had 
advanced monies to an individual in order to earn a profit thereon, 
the court found that subsequent losses incurred as a result of the 
borrower failing to honour his commitments, even though there had been 
a series of transactions, were of a capital nature and not, therefore, 
deductible. In addressing the nature of the loss (that is, was it a 
. loss of fixed or floating capital) Corbett AJA stated, at 129: 
"The central issue remains: was this loss of a capital or not 
capital nature? One way of dealing with this issue - and one 
that to me has a logical appeal - is to ask what was it that was 
lost? The answer, I think, is clear: the appellant lost the 
capital which he had advanced ... The next enquiry follows as a 
natural collolary: was the capital lost fixed · or floating 
(circulating capital)? ... 
Applying the distinction, thus described, to the ordinary case 
of a loan of money, there is no doubt, in my opinion, that the 
capital lent constitutes fixed capital ... It is true that the 



















passes but, in an economic and accounting sense, it remains his 
capital and upon the termination of the loan (all being well) it 
returns to him intact." 
In Stone's case supra it was evident from the facts outlined, that the 
taxpayer had either invested his capital base in the transaction, or 
had used it as security to raise further amounts by way of an 
overdraft. In this regard, Corbett AJA stated, at 132: 
"It was not argued that the fact that the appellant used 
borrowed monies to make loans was, in its elf, of any real 
significance. This could well have been a relevant factor had 
there been any question of a money lending business being 
carried on ... " 
Thus, in interpreting the principles determined by Stone's case supra, 
it would appear that the fact that a taxpayer enters into a money 
lending related transaction wherein a gain in excess of the amount 
advanced is anticipated, even though such a gain may be in a form 
other than interest and may be related to the profits of the 
underlying venture, is only circumstantial; the true enquiry is 
directed to the nature of the investment made, and the source from 
which it arose. To this end, the implication appears to be that loans 
advanced by a taxpayer will be advanced from his fixed capital unless 
there is evidence to the contrary. 
The question of when income earned by a taxpayer changes its nature 
from being floating or circulating capital into fixed capital would 
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appear to be determined with reference to either the date a trade 
debtor pays the amount, or the taxpayer and the debtor agree that the 
amount due be converted to a loan owing to the taxpayer, rather than 
a trade debt due. In ITC 808 20 SATC 343, which case concerned the 
remittance of receipts to South Africa from the United Kingdom wherein 
gains were made through favourable exchange· rates, the court was asked 
to consider whether or not such a gain was of a revenue or capital 
nature. In finding that the gain was of a revenue nature, Price J 
stated at 346: 
"Until the debt was paid it represented a claim for services 
rendered - as such it was impressed with an income or revenue 
character. It remained a revenue claim and would keep this 
character until it was altered by some transaction of which it 
formed the subject." 
The above aspect was further clarified in CIR v Brown Brothers Limited 
20 SATC 55, which case concerned a taxpayer who agreed to leave 
certain commissions due to it in the hands of a foreign company in 
order to enable that company to bolster its reserves. As with ITC 
808, a gain was made as a result of exchange rate variances, which 
gain the Commissioner sought to tax. In discussing the nature of this 
gain, Blackwell J stated at 59: 
"What imprint did this money bear throughout this period (being 
the period retained by the foreign company). It seems to us 
that the Special Court was right in holding that this was a loan 
or something in the nature of the loan ... What was formally 
I 
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money owing, now, by the mere fact· of in the new agreement, 
becomes money lent." 
Regarding the deductibility of amounts due to the taxpayer as a result 
of services rendered, or merchandise sold, Section ll(i) to the Income 
Tax Act permits a taxpayer to deduct from "Income" as defined in 
Section 1 to the said Act debts proved to be bad, where such amounts 
were included in the income of the taxpayer. 
Thus, the question of whether or not trade debts themselves constitute 
a capital or revenue asset has not been directly addressed by the 
courts, other than in respect of the cases mentioned. However, the 
Income Tax Reporter I indicates that debts due to a taxpayer are of a 
capital nature when they are sold. No direct authority was quoted for 
this supposition, but the inference to be derived from this article is 
that Section ll(i) is necessary to permit a taxpayer to deduct bad 
debts as they are of a capital nature; thus, but for Section ll(i) bad 
debts would, therefore, be excluded from the general deduction formula 
by virtue of their capital nature. However, Meyerowitz and Spiro on 
Income Tax 2 make the statement that Section ll(i) is necessary as bad 
debts do not represent accrued income, and their subsequent non-
recovery does not represent a-loss or expenditure in the production of 
income deductible under Section ll(a). It could therefore be stated 
that the capital or revenue nature of a trade debt was not a factor 
affecting the decision of Parliament to introduce Section ll(i), but 
rather such a debt's non-accrual; thus, the premise that a debt due 
retains the nature of income until it is converted to capital by a 
formal act (either its payment or its conversion to a loan) is 
, .. 24 -!. 
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reasonable. 
Further, it is, it is considered, difficult to envisage trade debts 
being of a capital nature as their non-recovery must be with in the 
reasonable contemplation of everyday business. Thus, any non-recovery 
must be viewed as a "necessary concomitant" 3 of the business, and 
therefore a foreseeable or anticipated business cost (loss). 
2.1 GENERAL TESTS 
The question of whether an item of expenditure (and income) is 
of a capital or revenue nature has been considered in detail by 
our courts, with case law on the subject being prolific. The 
criteria to be applied in determining whether an item of income 
(or expenditure) is of a capital nature were summarised in ITC 
1185 1 at 123. The tests to be extracted from ITC 1185 supra are 
as follows: 
o The fundamental enquiry is whether, in buying and selling 
the property and thus earning the profit ... the taxpayer 
was engaged in carrying on a trade or business or profit 
making scheme. If that is what he was doing, the profits 
are income and taxable in his hands. If, however, he held 
the property as an investment of capital the realisation 
of the asset would simply be a conversion of the capital 
asset to cash, which he would receive and hold as capital, 






Perhaps the most important test in considering whether it 
is one or the other of these, is the intention with which 
or the object for which the property was acquired. 
It is clear that the application of the test will not in 
all cases produce the true answer to the fundamental 
question; a taxpayer might have bought property with the 
intention of holding it as an investment of capital ... but 
have changed his mind at a later stage and resolved to 
merge that asset with his ordinary stock in trade. 
Where the taxpayer had not one clear purpose or intention 
in acquiring the property but was alive to more than one 
use to which he might have put it, the enquiry will be to 
determine, if possible, whether one particular purpose was 
dominant in his mind. If the court is able to find there 
was a dominant purpose, which operated decisively or very 
substantially in the process which lead to the decision to 
acquire the property, the court will give effect to that 
dominant purpose or intention. 
The difficulty in these cases lies not so much in the 
formulation of approach but in the application of the 
principles which must necessarily guide the court. 
Although ITC 1185 dealt with the question of whether a gain 
derived from the sale .of property arose from the appellant being 
engaged in a business or profit making scheme, it is considered 
2.2 
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that the tests laid down in determining the capital or revenue 
nature of income are equally applicable in determining the 
capital or revenue nature of expenditure 2 
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
As identified in ITC 1185 quoted above, the fundamental enquiry 
is whether the taxpayer was engaged in the carrying on of a 
trade or business or profit making scheme. In the case of 
losses incurred on irrecoverable loans or advances, great 
emphasis has been placed on the nature of a taxpayer's 
activities when considering whether such losses were of a 
capital or revenue nature. In this regard, it would appear that 
the courts have been reluctant to consider occasional money 
lending transactions as being a profit making scheme when the 
other business activities of a taxpayer are not complimentary or 
supportive to such an activity, or the money lending 
transactions were not an adjunct to the taxpayer's other 
business activities. 
In ITC 1009 1 JCR Fieldsend QC stated, at 278: 
"It was common cause that, as laid down in a long series 
of money lending cases, the issues were twofold: (1) did 
the appellant carry on a business of money lending, and 
(2) if so, was the loan in question made as a part of that 
business?" 
20 
Thus, the above statement which, it is considered succinctly 
summarises the directions ta~en by the court to date, looks for 
the "carrying on of a business" of money lending when conducting 
an enquiry into the nature of losses made on monies advanced. 
Ad hoc, or occasional money lending transactions, 
notwithstanding the fact that these transactions were entered 
into in order to earn profits, have been viewed as capital 
transactions by the courts. In the case of Stone v SIR 2 at 130, 
Corbett AJA stated: 
"At no stage was it contended in this case that the 
appellant was carrying on a money lending business." 
Further, and in quoting from the judgement of the Special Court, 
Corbett AJA stated at 130: 
"Each transaction involved a "once and for all" 
expenditure. The expenditure was not recurring and was 
not incurred in the course of the conduct of a continuous 
business as for instance would have been the case where a 
person lent money in the course of his trade as a money 
lender." 
In applying the above principles, the courts have indicated that 
there must, as laid down in the preamble to Section 11, be a 
"carrying on" of a trade. Thus, a degree of continuity would 
appear to be essential. Although the definition of "trade", 
contained in Section 1 to the Act, includes the term "venture" 
21 
which term has been defined in ITC 368 3 to refer to a "financial 
or commercial speculation", it would appear that the courts have 
taken a very narrow view on the phrase "carrying on", and where 
there is no such activity, to find that the taxpayer had failed 
to discharge the onus on him in terms of Section 84 to the Act, 
of showing that the capital invested had changed its nature and 
become floating rather than fixed capital. 
The above conclusion differentiates the provisions of the Gross 
Income Definition, which taxes receipts and accruals, from that 
of Section 11, wherein expenditure is deducted. In this regard, 
the Gross Income Definition seeks to bring to account all 
receipts and accruals which are not of a capital nature, whether 
or not they are associated with an isolated transaction (See 
Stephan v CIR 32 SATC 54 wherein the receipts and accruals of a 
"one off" salvage operation were brought to account) whilst 
Section ll(a) only permits the deduction of expenditure and 
losses incurred in ongoing business activities. 
The above approach was, it is considered, summarised by Van 
Wins en J's following comments •· 
"It is true that in income tax circles single swallows 
have been known to herald a summer.. Thus, in CIR v Stott. 
3 SATC 253, it was recognised that in certain 
circumstances a single undertaking might be of such a 
nature that it could be correctly described as carrying on 
of a business. Freely conceding the applicability of this 
T 
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principle, each case is nevertheless so dependent upon its 
own facts that little or no assistance can be derived from 
the mere recognition of its existence." 
In finding against the taxpayer in the above case, Van ~insen 
concluded that the correct approach was to look at the purported 
money lending transactions against the totality of a taxpayer's 
loan transactions, and to consider where, in the light of such 
dealings, the taxpayer has discharged the onus of proving that 
the money lent was advanced in the course of a money lending 
business. Thus, applying the terminology used by the judge, it 
would appear necessary for there to be more than one swallow for 
a taxpayer to be considered as having embarked on a money 
lending business. 
The tests laid down in determining whether or not a taxpayer is 
involved in the business of money lending are, as detailed in 
ITC 812 5 , as follows: 
o ~ether or not the appellant is a money lender or carries 
on the business of a money lender is a question of fact; 
o The principles applicable to profits apply a fortiori to 
the profits of money lenders. It has to be remembered 
that money is the "stock in trade" of a money lender; 
o Investment by an individual of even large sums on 
.mortgages of real estate is not in itself sufficient to 
0 
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constitute a business; 
The main difference between an investor and a money lender 
appears to consist in the fact that latter aimed at 
frequency of turnover of his money and for that purpose 
usually requires borrowers to make regular repayments on 
account of principle; 
o This has been described as a "system or plan in laying out 
and getting in his money"; 
0 The obtaining of security is a usual but not an essential 
feature of every loan made in such a business; 
o A person may be a money lender even though he does not 
advertise or hold himself out as such. 
As indicated above, the principle enquiry is the business 
activities of the taxpayer. That is, determining from a general 
point of view whether or not the taxpayer is a money lender, as 
such an issue is a statement of fact. However, the enquiry'must 
go further and establish the function in the taxpayer's hands of 
the money which came to it. 
In the case of Plate Glass and Shatterprufe Industries v SIR at 
112 6 , Margot J stated: 
"However, I wish to guard against a conclusion in this 
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court based solely on the nature of the taxpayer's 
business, and on whether or not the appellant proved that 
its business was that of a banker or money lender. 
The true enquiry seems to me to be to determine the 
function in the appellent's hands of the money which came 
to it from SIE. If that money was held by it on revenue 
account, as working capital employed by it for the purpose 
of being turned over at a prof it, then any loss in so 
turning it over would prime facie be deductible. 
In this enquiry the nature of the appellant's business 
provides an important guide, but is not conclusive". 
The above case dealt with losses incurred as a result of 
exchange rate fluctuations on loans due to foreign lenders. The 
court, in finding against the taxpayer, held that, 
notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer was a money lender, 
the "character,,- of the finance raised in the taxpayer's hands 
was "nothing more or less than capital raised by the PGSI Group 
for use by companies in that Group, and the taxpayers receipt 
and administration of the money was for that purpose and not for 
itself". (At 112) Further, the fact that the taxpayer was a 
separate juristic persona from the Group did not change the 
character of these funds. 
In pursuing the enquiry as to the nature of the taxpayer's 




activities of the taxpayer in general, and not necessarily to 
the specific facts in question. By way of an example, 
ITC 933 1 , concerned a taxpayer who claimed, as a deduction, 
loans no longer recoverable where the taxpayer had not lent or 
advanced new sums during the tax year in question. In 
commenting on the taxpayer's activities, van Winsen J stated, at 
350: 
"Only a single loan had been made during that year ... 
However, in order to obtain a true picture one must look 
at all the preceding years from the time when the 
appellant claimed he had started carrying on a money 
lending business ... in order to ascertain whether there 
was any continuity and system about the various loan 
transactions pointing in the direction of a money lending 
business". 
A further consideration in determining whether or not a taxpayer 
is a money lender is the attitude the taxpayer may have with 
regard to funds invested. As indicated above, the money lender 
aims at frequency of turnover and thus usually requires 
borrowers to make regular payments on account of principle. 
This point was emphasized in Plate Glass and Shatterprufe 
Industries supra at 112 where Margot J found that, although the 
taxpayer showed all the characteristics attributable to a money 
lender, the funds raised by it were "nothing more or less than 
capital raised by the . . Group for use by companies in that 
Group". Thus, the company, although not an investor, was purely 
I 
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an administrative vehicle to co-ordinate the Group's companies 
funding requirements. It did not, therefore, view funds raised 
by it, (and therefore advanced) as being its "stock in trade". 
The existence of a "system or plan in laying out and getting his 
money" (ITC 812 at 472) is also an important, but not decisive 
fe~ture. In ITC 1003 8 , the taxpayer who had surplus short term 
funds agreed to lend amounts to third parties at market related 
(it would appear) interest rates incurred losses on funds 
advanced. 
taxpayer. 
These losses were claimed ·for tax purposes by the 
The courts, in finding against the taxpayer, 
emphasized that (at 239): 
"The existence of continuity and system is only an element 
to be considered with the other facts of the case anJ the 
surrounding circumstances. That a business of money 
lending is being carried on is not the only inference to 
be drawn from a degree of continuity and system ... _" 
In the above case, the court found that the appellant was merely 
finding temporary employment for surplus funds and, as such, 
losses incurred were on capital account. This consideration was 
upheld in Plate Glass's case supra. 
Furthermore, the courts held in ITC 1003 that the fact that 
there was recurrent expenditure was similarly inconclusive in 
itself for the reasons identified above. Thus, where a taxpayer 
merely "wants to make the money work on a short term basis", the 
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inference that the taxpayer has embarked on a money lending 
business is not automatic and will need to be considered in 
conjunction with the factors outlined above. 
From an investor's point of view, funds invested would be 
invested with the objective of deriving a long term gain, which 
gain is analogous to the acquisition of any other business 
asset. For example, the courts found in Atlantic Refining 
Company of Africa's case 9 that the granting of loans to petrol 
retailers in order to secure a "tie" with the retailers was a 
"once and for all" disbursement which resulted in an enduring 
benefit. A similar decision was reached in the Canadian courts 
in Business Art Inc's 10 case where loans were advanced to 
establish a supplier in the United Kingdom. As the transaction 
was intended "to create an asset of enduring benefit" (page 
2006), subsequent losses on loans advanced were found to be of 
a c~pital nature. 
Further, in Salisbury Board of Executors Limited' s case 11 , which 
case concerned the investment by the appellant in mortgage 
bonds, Blakeway J stated, at 10: 
"I can see little distinction in principle between the 
acquiring of an asset like a mortgage bond for the purpose 
of deriving an income from that asset and the purchase of 
land in order to make a profit from the produce of such 
land." 
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Notwithstanding the above, the courts have, in certain 
instances, permitted the deduction of losses incurred as a 
result of money lending transactions where taxpayers have been 
able to show: 
o The loan transaction was entered into in order to derive 
a profit therefrom; and 
o Loans and advances were made in the ordinary course of the 
taxpayer's business. 
(This approach is identical to that adopted by the Australian 
courts, as evidenced in Fairway Estates (Pty) Limited v COT 
(Aust) 123 CCR 153 (1970).) 
In the case of ITC 1344 12 the court found that, where a taxpayer 
formed a private company and advanced funds to that company by 
way of loans, with the specific intention of selling the shares 
and loan accounts at a profit, that subsequent losses incurred 
on the sale of the loan account were deductible. This case did 
not distinguish between shares on the one hand and loans on the 
other and, at 24, stated: 
"It is clear on the agreed facts that the shares and loan 
accounts were acquired by the appellant for the purpose of 
resale at a profit". 
This case is, however, to be contrasted with Burman vs CIR 53 
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SATC 63. The facts of Burman's case were, in many respects, 
similar to those of ITC 1344 supra. The court, in finding 
against the taxpayer commented that (at 71): 
"However Burman regarded his shares and loans accounts, 
the fact is that he did indeed hold two different economic 
entities". 
Further, in commenting on the decision in ITC 1344, Goldstone JA 
emphasized that (at 73): 
"The decision in that case (ITC 1344) is only explicable 
upon the agreed facts which recorded, inter alia, that: 
'It was-- at all relevant times his intention to sell the 
said shares and loan account as soon as a development was 
completed with a view to a profit'." 
Thus, although the principle has been accepted in the Appellant 
Division that loans can be acquired, or created with the 
intention to sell together with another asset (being shares in 
this instance) that intention will only be considered if it is 
clearly demonstrated. Where this is not, however, the case, the 
court will look at the underlying legal nature of the loan in 
the taxpayer's hands, and if it constituted an investment of the 
taxpayer's capital, it will comprise an investment of a capital 
nature and will therefore be precluded as a deduction from the 
taxpayer's income in the event of a loss being incurred. 
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Where a taxpayer is not a money lender, but carries on a 
business which necessitates money being lent or the lending of 
the money is an adjunct to its main business, losses incurred 
may, subject to the facts, constitute a loss of a revenue nature 
and therefore be deductible for tax purposes. For example, in 
ITC 434 13 , which case concerned losses incurred by shipping and 
clearing agents on amounts paid or advanced on behalf of their 
customers, the court found, at 448, that the transactions 
entered into were of a kind common with clearing agents, and 
that they are transactions entered into in connection with the 
earning of the taxpayer's ordinary revenue or income as clearing 
agents. Further, even where a taxpayer adopts procedures 
dissimilar to those used by other businesses in the industry in 
order to enhance his income earning ability by, for example, 
lending money to suppliers, losses incurred may be of a revenue 
nature and therefore deductible. The issue is, principally, 
whether or not the taxpayer adopted as a method of conducting 
his trade the advancing of money. In ITC 807 14 the taxpayer, 
being a merchant, advanced funds to a manufacturer in order to 
secure the supply of goods, with the advances to be liquidated 
by the supply of goods in the ordinary course of business. The 
taxpayer suffered losses on these advances. 
finding for the taxpayer, stated at 340: 
The court, in 
"There was a double object in making loans to the 
manufacturing company, vis to keep that concern going so 
that the appellant could be assured of a supply of goods 




Further, in discussing the method in which the taxpayer had 
elected to conduct his business, against the methods 
traditionally employed in specific businsses, the court stated, 
at 341: 
"It seems to me that it is not essential t6 find that the 
making of advances is a customary way of carrying on the 
kind of business carried on by the appellant, so long as 
it is being shown to have been the way in which the 
appellant itself carries on its business ... The real 
question is, how does the appellant carry on its business, 
not how do other people carry on their businesses". 
Once a conclusion has been reached on the nature of the business 
activities conducted by a taxpayer, and assuming those 
activities are the lending of money, thi next enquiry is to 
ascertain whether or not the debt in question was made during 
the course of those business activities (ITC 1009 supra). An 
enquiry of this nature is common to any item of expenditure 
claimed by a taxpayer. In this regard, it,is considered that 
Section ll(a) requires that each item of expenditure incurred by 
a taxpayer be investigated independently and tested against the 
criteria contained therein. Thus, in ITC 933 supra, the court 
found that a taxpayer who could be regarded as "money lender" 
could not deduct losses incurred on a particular loan because 





lending operations. Thus, where it can be shown that a 
particular amount advanced, which has proved irrecoverable, was 
not advanced in the course of the taxpayer's ordinary business 
operations, such amount may be precluded as a deduction from 
income for the following reasons: 
0 
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The loan advanced constituted a part of the taxpayer's 
capital and not his "stock in trade", and thus the amount 
so advanced was of a capital nature; or 
The amount was advanced for reasons other than trade, and 
as such, it was precluded as a deduction in view of the 
prohibition contained in Section 23(g) of the Act. This 
aspect is discussed more fully in Part III. 
Regarding the capital nature of any particular amount advanced, 
the courts (see ITC 933 supra at 352) have frequently stated 
that the particular transaction must be looked at against the 
background of the appellant's loan transactions as a whole. In 
ITC 1009 supra, the taxpayer incurred a loss in respect of a 
portion of a loan due from a club; the taxpayer's managing 
director was chairman of the club. The court found that the 
taxpayer was carrying on a money lending business but as the 
loan due to the club was initially interest free and unsecured 
(later attracting favourable interest rates), the loan was 
nevertheless, more of a "personal accommodation" arranged 
between the taxpayer's managing director and the club, than a 
business loan made in the course of the taxpayer's money lending 
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business. (See also ITC 44 (1925) 2 SATC 116 where the courts 
found that the loss arising on a guarantee being called, which 
guarantee was given by a cartage company to secure work from a 
building contractor, fell outside the scope of its business 
activities and, as such, the resultant loss was of a capital 
nature.) 
Thus, in order for a taxpayer to be successful in contending 
that the loan being claimed as a deduction was a part of the 
taxpayer's money lending business, the taxpayer must be able to 
show that the particular loan was, on the balance of 
probabilities, advance in the course of its money lending 
business. (See ITC 933 supra.) 
2 . 3 INTENTION 
The next enquiry to be made with reference to any irrecoverable 
loan or advance is to ascertain whether the funds so advanced 
are held as a part of the taxpayer's fixed capital; if they are 
the resultant loss will be of a capital nature. If they are 
not, the funds advanced are, by implication, of a revenue nature 
and thus the loss is similarly a loss of floating or circulating 
capital 1 
It has frequently been stated that the most important test in 
considering whether the asset was of a revenue or capital nature 
is the intention with which, or the object for which, the 
property was acquired 1 
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In CIR v Stott 2 at 262 Wessels JA stated~ 
"It was sufficient to say that intention was an important 
factor and unless some other factor intervened to show 
that when the article was sold it was sold in pursuance of 
a scheme of profit making, it was conclusive in 
determining whether it was capital or gross income". 
Although Stott's case supra dealt with the question of whether 
land disposed of by the taxpayer was on a capital or revenue 
account, it is considered that the above principle is equally 
applicable in cases where outgoings are concerned. To this end, 
the above phrase was quoted, with approval, in Salisbury Board 
of Executors Limited's case 3 
In analysing the role finance plays in funding a business's 
operations, Russel CJ in Salisbury Board of Executors Limited 4 
commented as follows: 
o Circulating capital is a portion of the subscribed capital 
of the company intended to be used by being temporarily 
parted with and circulated in business in the form of 
money, goods or other assets, and which or the proceeds of 
which are intended to be returned to the company with 
increment and are intended to be used again and again; 
o The terms "fixed" and "circulating" are merely terms 
convenient for describing the purpose to which the capital 
I 
35 
is for the time being devoted in considering its position 
in respect to the profits available for dividends. Thus 
when circulating capital is expended in buying goods which 
are sold at a profit ... the amount so expended must be 
charged against, or deducted from, receipts before the 
amount of any profits can be arrived at. 
In concluding, Russel CJ at 7, stated: 
"It appears from the (above) that the determining factor 
is to be. looked for in the intention of the company and 
the distinction, so far as money is concerned, seems to me 
to be a difference of degree rather than a difference of 
kind". 
Although the above analogy with a merchant who invests in 
materials, and charges this cost against revenues earned does 
not apply directly to money lenders, the conclusion that the 
question is a matter degree provides the focus for any such 
investigation. In the case of an ordinary merchant costs 
incurred in generating receipts, such as the acquisition of 
materials, are indeed expensed against the receipts so earned; 
on the other hand, it would appear that a money lender or 
investor does not have such an expense, as amounts advanced have 
not, in the true legal sense, been parted with and do not thus 
constitute a cost. The only similar "cost" which could be 
incurred by the person lending money would be costs unwittingly 
incurred as a result of a borrower defaulting. From this point 
pa ££ Qi 
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of view, it is considered unlikely that the money lender or 
investor would make any such loan or advance with the intention 
of losing the amount so advanced. It would appear, therefore, 
that the key consideration is not the intention of a taxpayer in 
making any such advance, but the way it views its financial 
resources, namely whether or not they constitute its "stock in 
trade". 
Thus, the taxpayer's intention in advancing capital is to be 
looked at in general, rather than the intention with which a 
specific loss was occasioned. In the event of a particular 
transaction proving bad, and assuming the taxpayer is a money 
lender, then the resultant loss would be expensed against income 
for tax purposes not by reason of the expense being "the cost of 
acquiring trading stock", but by reason of the loss being a 
"necessary concomittant" 5 • In Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Limited's case 6 at 18, Watermeyer AJP stated, at 17: 
"All expenses attached to the performance of a business 
operation bona fide performed for the purpose of earning 
income are deductible whether such expenses are necessary 
for its performa.nce or attached to it by chance". 
Port Elizabeth Electric Tramways case supra concerned the 
deductibility of a loss occasioned as a result of an accident 
involving one of its drivers. In commenting on the 
deductibility of the resultant expenditure, Watermeyer AJP at 18 





ttJn this case the potential liability is there all the 
time and is inseparable from the employment of drivers -
that is to say inseparable from the carrying on of the 
business". 
Although the above extracts from Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway 
Company Limited's case concerned whether or not the expenditure 
was incurred "in the production of income", it is considered 
that they give valuable insight as to the nature of losses 
occasioned by loans being irrecoverable, and provide an 
objective approach to evaluating the nature of the funds 
invested by a taxpayer. Thus, where it can be ascertained that 
a loss resulting from an irrecoverable loan or advance, although 
unwanted, was attached to the normal business operations of the 
taxpayer, then it would be fair to conclude that the funds so 
advanced formed a part of the taxpayer's floating capital. 
Thus, it could be stated that the taxpayer advanced the funds in 
the full knowledge that they may prove irrecoverable and 
accepted this risk as a part of its normal business risk; the 
taxpayer's intention was, therefore, to assume this risk in the 
expectation of a gain. Compared to an investor, there would be 
a contrary intention, namely, to avoid such a risk as the 
capital (being the investment) is to be preserved. 
Following a review of relevant cases put before the courts 
relating to losses on loans and advances, it would appear that 
the courts have placed great emphasis on the nature of the funds 
in the taxpayer's hands and, it is considered, made it difficult 
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for taxpayers other than those directly involved in a money 
lending business to claim resultant losses. This burden on the 
taxpayer is, it is considered, largely attributable to the 
inherent nature of a taxpayer's earning ability as that is, by 
definition, of a capital nature; in the case of finance, this 
evidences the taxpayer's capital structure and therefore 
abilities. Thus, and even though, occassional transactions 
entered into by a taxpayer may prima facie appear to be 
speculative by nature (see Stone's case 7) the courts will look 
behind the transaction to ascertain the underlying nature of the 
asset invested. Further, if the taxpayer is unable to show that 
he has changed his intention with regard to that portion of his 
capital, then any losses incurred will be of a capital nature. 
In this regard, it is considered that a taxpayer would have a 
less onerous burden in proving a change of intention when 
transacting with any other form of asset. 
This distinction arises, it is considered, because of the very 
nature of a taxpayer's capital. Capital is measured in monetary 
terms, irrespective of the nature it takes. Thus, money becomes 
the effective medium of exchange (even where an exchange is in 
the form of barter). When money itself is risked that portion 
so risked would appear to be indistinguishable from the entirity 
of the taxpayer's capital. In the case of another form of 
asset, separation is more readily achieveable. 
For the above reasons, and as previously discussed, the courts 
appear to have placed great emphasis on a taxpayer's affairs in 
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general and looked at the nature of the taxpayer's business 
operations in order to ascertain whether or not they are money 
lending and where money lending transactions are not performed, 
whether the transaction was an adjunct to, or an integral part 
of, the taxpayer's business. 
For example, in Burman's case 8 the taxpayer was able to show 
clearly that he had entered into a transaction . with the 
intention of earning a profit, but the courts found that this 
intention related to his investment in shares, and not loans 
advanced to companies formed, the shares of which were to be 
sold. Goldstone JA at 71 stated: 
"In short, Burman' s intention that he would be repaid the 
loans together with the sale of his shares in the property 
companies was in no way inconsistent with the loans being 
genuine and they having the legal consequences which 
usually flow from contracts of loan". 
Thus, it can be seen from the above quote, that although the 
courts accepted there was clearly an intention to sell the 
shares at a profit, the granting of a loan to this same company 
was a separate and distinct transaction and at best Burman could 
have anticipated a repayment of the loan. Thus, the fact that 
a taxpayer had elected to fund a business transaction in a two 
fold manner, namely by "expending" his capital on the 
acquisition of shares, and secondly by investing a portion of 
the same capital in loan accounts, the court found that the loss 
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on the expenditure was different from the loss on capital 
advanced; whereas the one would be deductible the other would 
not. This aspect reinforced the finding in ITC 1322 42 SATC 
269, where at 272 the court stated "it is however, not possible 
to ignore the existence of the company". (This case concerned 
facts similar in many respects to that of Burman's case supra.) 
Although the courts have proved reluctant to allow losses 
incurred on loans advanced where there was either an absence of 
intention, or the intention with regard to the capital so 
advanced was not clearly stated, they have accepted that losses 
on loan capital are deductible where there is a clear intention 
on behalf of the taxpayer to trade with those loans. In ITC 
1344 44 SATC 19 the taxpayer was able to show that it was at all 
relevant times his intention to sell the said shares and loan 
accounts as soon as the (property) development was completed 
with a view to making a profit (at 20). 
taxpayer, Grosskopf J stated, at 25: 
In finding for the 
"The benefit which the lender hoped to derive from his 
loan was not the return of his capital with interest, but 
a profit on the sale and cession of the loan. The ratio 
for holding that, in loans of the form and type, the 
capital lent constitutes fixed capital does not, in our 
view, apply to loans of the latter type." 
.Coming to the above conclusion, great emphasis was placed on the 
fact that the taxpayer intended to sell his loan whereas, in 
--------
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Stone's case supra and Crane's case 9 the taxpayers advanced 
funds on which a return was expected in the form of interest or 
some other consideration, together with a repayment of the 
capital borrowed. (It should be noted that this principle was 
accepted in Burman's case, at 73; Golstone JA noted, in 
distinguishing Burman' s case from ITC 1344 supra that there were 
no facts in evidence in Burman's case which established a clear 
intention to sell the shares and loan accounts at a profit). 
Thus, it may be stated in the case of losses occassioned as a 
result of money lending transactions by persons other than money 
lenders, the role of "intention" is not as critical as it is in 
other transactions as there is an automatic presumption that 
amounts advanced are of a capital nature. Intention 
nevertheless, plays an important role in evaluating the 
deductibility of such losses. 
2.3.1 Definition of Intention 
As discussed, intention is an important, and often 
conclusive factor. Although the term "intention" is 
frequently used in income tax cases (as evidenced by the 
cases ref erred to) the courts do not appear to have 
defined it and appear to have used accepted legal 
definitions. However, references to a taxpayer's 
intention appear to use, interchargeably, a taxpayer's 
motive or purpose. It is considered that this distinction 
is unjustified and a fusing the two concepts could lead to 
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different conclusions. 
The Oxford English Dictionary refers to intention as 
"one's purpose of doing". Purpose is defined as "the 
object to be obtained; the thing intended". 
defined as "that what induces a person to act". 
Motive is 
Thus, a taxpayer's purpose in making an advance could be 
different from its motive. For example, a taxpayer may 
advance funds interest-free to a recreational club of 
which he is a member, with the purpose qf providing that 
club with short term funding in order to enable it to meet 
its short term needs, whilst the taxpayer's motive could 
have been to demonstrate its funding abilities to club 
members, and thereby attract additional business. In the 
event of the advance proving bad, and becoming 
irrecoverable, the court 
conclusions, depending on 
could reach different 
its analysis of the term 
"intention". 
~ere the court to look at the motive of the taxpayer, it 
could be argued that the taxpayer's motive was to use the 
opportunity made available to demonstrate its business 
abilities, and thereby generate income. As such, a 
subsequent loss could have been classified as being a loss 
incurred "in the production of income". On the other 
hand, the taxpayer's purpose was clearly to provide short 
term funding to the club. As the purpose did not have 
& 
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overt income tax consequences, the resultant loss would 
clearly be di~allowed for tax purposes. In the case of 
CIR v Pick 'n Pay 1 the courts looked predominently at the 
chairman's purpose in making a donation. 
dissenting judgement, Nestadt JA noted, at 152: 
In his 
"The difficulty in the present type of case is that 
there is unavoidably and inevitably present the 
intention to benefit the donee; it is inherent in 
the activity in question. But that does not per se 
disqualify or preclude the expenditure from having 
been incurred with the sole object of promoting 
trade. For as (the learned judge) observes 
'otherwise it would follow that all entertaining 
expenses,. or charitable donations would be 
necessarily included'. 
This is not so. There will in these circumstances 
only be a dual purpose where there exists a 
deliberate and independent or distinct secondary 
motive which inspired the expenditure; as it has 
been called a private purpose". 
In concluding, the judge stated at 155: 
"To sum up on this issue. What ever the subordinate 
a.r1d private or personal objective of Hr Ackermann 
may have been, from the respondents (Pick 'n Pay's) 
;szz -· 
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point of view it discharged the onus of proving that 
the donation was actuated purely by commercial 
motives; its purpose in benefitting the Urban 
Foundation was not an independent or distinct one". 
Notwithstanding the above distinction, the majority found 
that Pick 'n Pay had a dual purpose, which was to benefit 
the Urban Foundation; it appears to have ignored the 
taxpayer's motive which appeared predominent. Thus, the 
courts tended to view the "cause and effect" of the 
transaction as one. In Pick 'n Pay' s case supra, the 
motive, being the quest for publicity, induced Pick 'n Pay 
to consider donating amounts to a philanthropic 
organisation; the purpose was, the courts found, twofold, 
namely the desire to obtain publicity, an~/ __ the desire to 
benefit a charitable organisation. In this case, the 
motive did not appear to be a factor in the court's 
judgement. 
On the other hand, in Atlantic Refining's case 2 the 
courts looked at the "paramount motive" of advancing 
funds. In discussing the capital or revenue nature of an 
amount of money advanced by the company to secure a "tie", 
which tie secured an enduring benefit for the business, 
Malan JA stated at 210: 
"An essential requisite of the test (of the capital 




paramount motive which operated upon the mind of the 
lender in entering into the agreement". 
In a further case 3 which concerned the acquisition by a 
taxpayer of two pieces of land, one to establish a cattle 
ranch and another to establish a home, neither objective 
being obtained, the courts found that on the subsequent 
disposal of the properties that the taxpayer's (dominant) 
motive was, in the first instance, to acquire the property 
for a capital purpose. In this regard, JCR Fieldsend QC 
looked at the taxpayer's "dominant motive" in order to 
ascertain his "dominant" intention. 
Based on the above, it would appear that in matters 
regarding a taxpayer's intention, greater emphasis is 
given to a taxpayer's motive than its purpose in entering 
into a transaction. This rule is not, however, clear and 
a distinction of the two terms would, at best, be 
inconclusive in examining a taxpayer's claim for the 
deduction of a loss incurred as a result of loans proving 
irrecoverable. 
It should also be noted that Pick 'n Pay's case concerned 
the application of Section 23 (g), and in particular, 
whether an amount was "exclusively" expended for the 
purposes of trade, and not the capital or revenue nature 
of the expenditure. The enquiry was, nevertheless, an 
enquiry into the state of the taxpayer's mind at the time 
Ml±t 
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the donation was made and, as such, provides a useful 
insight into the methodology applied by the courts in 
making such an enquiry. Notwithstanding this factor, the 
difference between "exclusively" in Section 23(g) and 
intention in the determination of capital expenditure or 
losses lies in degree; "exclusively" refers to the sole 
purpose of the expenditure whereas "intention" refers to 
the dominant factor motivating the action of the taxpayer. 
Thus, in concluding on the role of "purpose" in Section 
23(g) Botha JA stated 4 • 
"The concept of a 'dominant purpose' has no role to 
play here". 
2.3.2 Dominant Intention 
In determining the intention with which a taxpayer entered 
into a transaction, the taxpayer's dominant intention must 
be sought. Where a transaction was entered into with a 
dual purpose, it is the function of the court to seek, and 
give effect to the dominant factor operating to induce a 
taxpayer to effect the transaction. Unless one were to 
hold, which the Legislature could not have intended, that 
the taxpayer had to exclude the slightest contempletion of 
a profitable resale of the property, it seemed to the 
court that the only test to apply was that of a main or 




In COT (SR) v Levy 2 , which case concerned the sale by a 
taxpayer of shares in a property holding company acquired 
by him predominantly to earn income, the courts found 
that, notwithstanding the fact that Levy admitted to the 
hope that the value of the shares would increase and there 
would be a gain in excess of the amount paid, the 
dominant factor operating in the mind of the taxpayer was 
the desire to obtain a good revenue from the property. 
Where the courts cannot find a dominant intention, they 
will find that the taxpayer has failed to discharge the 
onus of proof on him where he is required, in case of 
irrecoverable loans, to show that the loans were advanced 
as a part of his ordinary course of business. In the case 
of COT v Glass 3 , which case concerned profits realised on 
the sale of immovable property, the courts found that the 
taxpayer could not show a dominant intention at the time 
the property was acquired. As such, the resultant gain 
was taxable. 
In applying the above to instances concerning 
irrecoverable loans, the courts have found that the 
''dominant feature" of the loan advanced is to be sought. 
In ITC 933 4 van Winsen J stated at 352: 
"It is apparent from the foregoing review of the 
appellant's loan transactions that the dominant 
feature of the loan transaction was that of an 
hE'MA&.i ,. 
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investment and not of money-lending. The greater 
portion of the loans were made for long periods and 
in some cases fixed property security was obtained. 
These loans clearly show an investment intention." 
Thus, the court in ascertaining a taxpayer's intention 
with regard to the employment of its capital looked to 
objective factors such as the period for which the funds 
were advanced, and security obtained. The court found the 
above, notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer had 
raised the funds, advanced via a short term loan 
(overdraft) at a rate of 5,5% interest whilst advancing 
the funds at rates of interest varying from 7% to 10%. 
Further on in the above judgement, at 353, the Judge felt 
that the correct approach was to look at the specific 
transactions against the background of the totality of the 
appellant's loan transactions and to ask whether, in the 
light of all such dealings, the appellant has discharged 
the onus of proving that the loan transactions in question 
were advanced in the course of a money lending business. 
It would therefore appear that, regarding the question of 
intention, funds advanced for specific transactions are 
viewed as coming from a common pool and it is the manner 
in which the taxpayer regards that pool which will 
determine the capital or revenue nature of a particular 
transaction. Thus, if a taxpayer's source of funds ~re 
fixed capital, and his use of the funds reflect this 
&.Qi 
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intention, then resultant losses, notwithstanding the fact 
that they may have resulted from speculative transactions, 
will constitute capital losses. This concept is further 
extended to include instances where a taxpayer uses its 
capital base as security to raise funds to on lend. Thus, 
in Stone's case 5 Corbett AJA commented: 
"I now turn to the second group of deductions, the 
losses sustained in respect of the suretyship (and 
guaranteed) transactions .... In either event, the 
enquiry is: what was lost ... It saems to me that 
in entering into these transactions appellant risked 
his capital in a manner similar to that in which the 
loans were made (to Kasmai); and that the losses 
which he ultimately sustained were losses of 
capital. These guarantees were not undertaken as a 
part of a business to give such guarantees." 
In discussing the "nature" or "character" of a guarantee, 
Corbett AJA also commented as follows s. 
"It was submitted by respondent's counsel that what 
appellant did in these instances was to 'pledge or 
lend his credit'. Though perhaps lacking in 
juristic accuracy, this description does indicate 
broadly, from a commercial point of view, what 
occurred." 
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Further, the courts have, in instances where a taxpayer is 
regarded as a money lender, looked at the purpose (or 
intention) with which amounts have been advanced. In ITC 
1327 6 the court found that the taxpayer was carrying on 
the business of money lending, but that a certain 
transaction to a company controlled by him was not made in 
pursuance of this business. Thus, the court concluded: 
"The true position is, as the court sees it, that 
the appellant decided to assist C to take over the 
company (and not in pursuance of its money lending 
operations)." 
Thus, the court in referring to the appellant's decision, 
made reference to its intention. This case reiterated the 
principle laid down in Atlantic Ref inings 's case whe·rein 
the courts . sought to ascertain "the paramount motive" 
which operated upon the. mind of the lender in entering 
into the agreement 7 • In Crane's case 8 , the taxpayer was 
persuaded by a third party to advance certain monies to a 
company for a period of three months in return for a 
market-related interest rate and a raising fee. Crane 
obtained security in the form of an acknowledgement of 
debt and the personal guarantee of the company's director. 
The company being unable to repay the debt in full was 
liquidated and the director sequestrated with the result 
that a portion of the amount owing became irrecoverable. 
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The taxpayer had been involved as a financial agent but 
had not, prior to the above transaction, advanced loans 
himself. In order to assist him embark on this business, 
he sold his house and a substantial portion of his 
furniture to make more money available. Thereafter, with 
the assistance of a financial agent, Crane entered into 
a number of transactions in addition to the one in 
question. 
In commenting on the respondent's argument that it was his 
intention to commence a business of money lending, the 
court stated, at 199: 
"The fact that three of the transactions were loans 
for short periods does not in itself turn the 
respondent into a person conducting a business of 
money lending . .. The evidence placed before the 
(court) does not in the light of the nature of the 
transactions which the respondent had·· concluded 
establish on a preponderance of probability the 
requisite intent of carrying on the business of 
money lending." 
Where a money lender enters into a money lending 
transaction with a twofold intention to, firstly earn 
interest income and, secondly to secure a capital right, 
it is considered that the courts will look for the 
"dominant" motive in entering into the transaction. In 
( 
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the event of there being losses on such a transaction the 
deductibilty of such a loss will be determined by the 
taxpayer's dominant motive. 
For example, in Fairway Estates case 9 the taxpayer, being 
a money lender, advanced funds in order to earn interest 
and at the same time secured a right to acquire 25% of the 
equity of the borrower. 
I 
The court, in finding for the 
taxpayer noted that the transaction was "normal" in the 
case of money lenders and was not therefore affected by 
this right. 
This case, which is Australian, correctly reflects, it is 
considered, the direction that will be taken by our courts 
in similar circumsta_nces. 
2.3.3 Change of Intention 
As indicated in the case of Crane referred to 
immediately above the mere fact that a taxpayer may have 
embarked on a series of transactions which have the 
characteristic of money lending transactions, is 
insufficient to result in the capital so invested taking 
on the nature of "floating capital". In commenting on the 
nature of capital, and its ability to change, Bos ho ff A.JP 
in Crane's case supra stated at 197: 
I 
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"(C)apital is fixed in the.sense of being invested 
in assets intended to be retained, more or less 
permanently, and used in producing an income. 
Circulating capital is capital intended to be used 
by being temporarily parted with and circulated in 
business in the form of money, goods or other assets 
and which or the proceeds of which are intended to 
return with an increment and are intended to be used 
again and again and so always return with some 
accretion ... It must not, however, be assumed that 
the division into which capital thus falls is 
permanent. The language is merely used to describe 
the purpose to which it is for the time being 
appropriated. This purpose may be changed as often 
as considered desirable." 
Although Boshoff AJP in the above case used the example of 
a bank investing a portion of its capital in immovable 
property, and periodically selling this property to invest 
the proceeds in its business, it would appear that the 
change in the nature of the capital envisaged in the 
above, is not as readily obtainable as may be anticipated 
from a reading of the above paragraph in cases other than 
that of a banker. 
In the case of John Bell and Company (Pty) Limited v 
SIR 2 r..1essels JA stated, at 105 when discussing the 
concept of a "change of intention" the following: 
I - ■ 
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"The mere change of intention to dispose of an asset 
hither to held as capital does not per se subject 
the resultant profit to tax. Something more is 
required in order to metamorphose the character of 
the asset and so render its proceed's gross income. 
For example, the taxpayer must already been trading 
in the same or similar kinds of assets, or he then 
and there starts some trade or business or embarks 
on some scheme for selling such assets for profits, 
and in either case, the asset in question is taken 
into or used as his stock in trade.» 
Although the above case concerned the sale by the taxpayer 
of certain immovable property, it is considered that the 
above test is equally applicable in the ca§e of moneys 
advanced which have proved irrecoverable. Thus, 
"something more" is required in order to change the nature 
of funds hither to held as capital in the hands of a 
taxpayer, and then advanced as a part of a speculative 
transaction, into floating capital. 
In Stone's case 3 the court, when commenting on short term 
money lending transactions entered into by the taxpayer 
stated: 
"The remuneration promised was, it is true, very 
rewarding - it was far in excess of normal (and even 
legal) rates of interest for such short term loans -
• 
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but I am unable- to see how this can alter its 
essential character as a quid pro quo for the loan. 
Accordingly, in so far as a loan investment may 
signify the laying out of capital... these loans 
qualify as 'investments'." 
Thus, Stone failed to persuade the court that the loan 
transactions under consideration had changed their nature; 
conversely he failed to persuade the court that he had 
changed his intention with regard to this capital thereby 
converting it to floating capital. 
In a further case •, which case concerned a taxpayer 
advancing monies by way of promissory notes which were 
subsequently dishonoured, the court stated that: 
"The evidence did not establish that the dominant 
motive for the making of the advances was that of 
profit. On the contrary the limitation of . the 
advances to companies in respect of which the 
appellant had an interest and a statement made by 
the witness called in support of the appellant's 
case that the loans were made to assist companies in 
which the appellant had a share interest, indicate 
positively that the dominant motive was not that of 
profit." 





can change its intention with regard to assets held by it, 
converting those assets to stock in trade 5 or assets 
previously held as trading stock may become capital 
assets 6 or a taxpayer may hold similar assets with 
different objectives (namely that of a capital asset and 
a revenue asset) 7 , taxpayers intending to embark on a 
money lending business, or taxpayers wishing to enter into 
isolated money lending transactions, would appear to have 
to discharge an onerous burden of proof should they be in 
the unfortunate position of wishing to deduct losses 
incurred as a result of these transactions. 
Taxpayers embarking on any venture entailing money lending 
may, nevertheless, be in a position to show that this was 
the case, and thus the losses are deductible. In this 
regard, the courts of the United Kingdom have expressed 
the following view 8 • 
"In my opinion, to say that if only one or two 
transactions can b~ proved, then as a matter of law, 
it cannot be said that they are transactions is a 
business, is too drastic a statement. I think that 
whether one or two transactions make a business 
depends upon the circumstances of each ca·se. I take 
the test to be this: if an isolated transaction, 
which if repeated would be a transaction in a 
business, is proved to have been undertaken with the 
intent that it should be the first of several 
B I -
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transactions, that is, with the intent of carrying 
on a business, then it is a first transaction in an 
existing business." 
In applying the above principle, had Crane or Stone been 
in a position to argue that they had embarked on a new 
venture and the transactions in question were losses 
sustained on the commencement of this venture (which 
losses discouraged or prohibited pursuance of the venture) 
they may have been able to pursuade the courts that the 
losses were not of a capital nature. 
2.3.4 Intention with Relation to Specific Transactions 
Regar~ing the ability of taxpayers to deduct losses 
incurred flowing from specific transactions which were 
entered into with the objective of making a profit (which 
profit would otherwise have been taxable), but which, for 
whatever reason, subsequently failed resulting in a loss, 
is also relevant. 
In this regard, the enquiry into the deductibility of an 
irrecoverable loan has, as stated above 1 been the 
subject of two enquiries, namely: 





Was the specific transaction a part of that 
business. 
Thus, each transaction must be viewed in order to 
ascertain a taxpayer's intention with regard to that 
transaction. Where the loss has been occassioned as a 
part of the taxpayer's ongoing business of money lending, 
or the loss was an adjunct to its business 2 , then a 
taxpayer will not be precluded from claiming such a loss 
as a deduction from its taxable income. 
Where, however, a taxpayer enters into a transaction where 
the purpose (intention) was not the furtherance of the 
taxpayer's business, then subsequent losses will be 
precluded from qualifying as a deduction for income tax 
purposes. In this regard, such an exclusion is within the 
ambit of Section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act as it is 
arguable that money so advanced was not advanced wholly 
and exclusively for the purposes of trade. 
Where a taxpayer enters into a specific transaction with 
the sole intention of investing capital in order to 
generate a profit, and the transaction subsequently 
results in a loss, it is considered that, notwithstanding 
the overriding intention of the taxpayer to earn a profit, 
resultant losses will not be allowable unless the taxpayer 
can show that that particular transaction was the first in 




fixed capital into floating capital (namely changing him 
into a money lender). 
In Stone's case 3 which case concerned losses arising 
from short-term speculative money lending transactions 
entered into by the taxpayer, Corbett AJA stated, at 130: 
"There is however in my view no warrant for 
extending this principle (that is, the deduction of 
losses occassioned by money lenders) to loans by 
persons who are not conducting a business of money 
lending." 
This decision was upheld in SIR v Crane 4 where Boshoff 
AJP found that, although the taxpayer had entered into the 
transactions with the intention of earning a profit 
therefrom, "the respondent has not shown that the 
transactions . . . were transactions in a money lending 
business or any other business for that matter so as to 
render the capital involved floating capital". 
Thus, it would appear that occassional losses arising from 
money lending transactions, even though a part of a 
company's business, will be viewed as being of a capital 
nature and not therefore allowed unless they are part of 
a money lending business. For example, in Harry S Hopkins 
and Company (Pvt) Ltd's case j the court found that, 






trade, they were nevertheless on a capital account. 
Notwithstanding the above, the courts have found 6 that, 
where a taxpayer can clearly demonstrate that he entered 
into a specific transaction which required he loan moneys 
to a company, and the loans were an integral part of that 
trade (namely to sell the shares and loans accounts as an 
indistinguishable unit for a profit), then the courts will 
accept that the transaction is of a revenue nature. 
Where, however, this specific intention cannot be clearly 
demonstrated then the loan account will be viewed as a 
item distinguishable from the shares and any subsequent 
loss on the realisation of the loan accounts will be 
viewed as being of a capital nature 7 
It should, however, be noted that the courts may 
distinguish between losses on loans advanced to fund 
"trading stock" and loans to earn interest or similar 
income. In =I~TC"--"""1~3~4_4 6 the taxpayer elected, for 
commercial and related reasons, to fund a property 
development conducted by a company in which he held shares 
by way of loans rather than through a subscription of 
share capital. At all times it was the clear intention of 
the taxpayer to sell, at a profit, his shares and loan 
account. This type of loan account has, it is considered, 
a different tax nature from a loan advanced where the 
taxpayer intends for that loan to be returned with a 








APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 
Although the courts may be in a position to identify a number of 
indicative factors which point to losses being either of a 
capital or revenue nature, it is trite to say that the 
difficulty in applying these principles lies not so much in the 
formulation of approach but in the application of the 
principles 1 • Thus, the courts may be in a position to identify 
a number of characteristics which are common to money lenders 
and these characteristics may be evident in a particular 
taxpayer, yet the subjective circumstances surrounding the 
taxpayer's affairs may, notwithstanding the manner in which its 
business is conducted, reveal that it is, in fact, not carrying 
on the business of a money lender. 
Thus, the approach followed by the court has been to, firstly, 
objectively analyse a taxpayer's business and then to look at 
the surrounding factors, and to weigh these factors against the 
results of the objective analysis identified. Thus, "the 
determining factor is to be looked for in the intention of the 
company and the distinction ... seems to me to be a difference of 
degree rather than a difference of kind" 2 
With regard to the above, the issue was succinctly summarised in 
Natal Estates Limited's case 3 where, at 220 Holmes JA stated: 
"In deciding whether a case is one of realising a capital 
.. 
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asset or of carrying on a business or embarking upon a 
scheme of selling land for profit, one must think one's 
way through all of the particular facts of each case ... 
From the totality of the facts one enquires whether it can 
be said that the owner had crossed the Rubicon and gone 
over to the business, or embarked upon a scheme, of 
selling such land for profit, using his land as stock in 
trade. 
Finally, one does not lose sight of the incidence of the 
onus of proving non-liability imposed by Section 82 of the 
Act, on the person claiming such non-liability, in the 
case the appellant." 
Although the above case dealt with the issue of land being sold 
by the taxpayer, and the taxpayer maintaining that the proceeds 
were non-taxable, the issues and principles identified therein 
are, it is considered, relevant to the matter under 
consideration. In this regard, Natal Estates Limited was 
formerly a property holding company which, at no stage prior to 
the sales in question, held land as trading stock. 
Notwithstanding this, the courts found there had been a change 
of intention with reference to the land formerly held as a 
capital asset, and this asset had been converted into trading 
stock. Regarding taxpayers attempting· to show that funds 
formerly held as fixed capital had been converted to floating 
capital, the degree of the new money lending activity would need 
to demonstrate that the taxpayer had crossed the Rubicon and 
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embarked on a business of money lending. Thus, the totality of 
the facts surrounding this activity should bear evidence to the 
assertion that the taxpayer's subjective intention had in fact 
changed. Failing this ability to clearly demonstrate the new 
business, the taxpayer will fail to discharge the onus placed 
upon him by Section 82 wherein the taxpayer is required to show 
that the loss suffered qualifies as a deduction from "Income", 
as defined (in Section 1). 
To evidence this approach, Plate Glass 4 was able to demonstrate 
that it bore all the signs typical of a money lender in both the 
way it raised finance and systematically control its use, 
thereby generating an interest margin. In examining the case, 
the court stated 5 "(one would) wish to guard against a 
conclusion ... based solely on the nature of the taxpayer's 
business and on whether or not the appellant proved that its 
business was that of a bank of money lender". 
In finding against the taxpayer, the court held: 
"The money was nothing more or less than capital raised by 
the PGSI Group for use by companies in that Group, and the 
appellant's receipt and administration of the money was 
for that purpose and not: for itself" 6 
Thus, on the totality of the facts, Plate Glass was unable to 
show that, notwithstanding its modus operandi, it was involved 
in the business of money lending. As such, the resultant loss 
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(on foreign exchange) was a loss on the capital account. 
Thus, the courts will endeavour to "look at the substance and 
reality of the transaction". 1 
2.5 OTHER FACTORS 
In addition to the factors outlined above, the courts have 
looked at certain factors specific to a taxpayer's business when 
deciding the deductibility or otherwise, of losses incurred on 
loans advanced. In particular, the following factors have 
proved relevant: 
o The source of the funds advanced; 
o The manner in which the funds were applied; and 
o Nature of security required by the borrower. 
In all of the above instances, the courts have looked to these 
factors in determining the nature of a taxpayer's capital namely 
whether the capital lost was fixed or floating. 
2.5.1 Source of Funds 
Businesses are funded through two principle mechanisms, 
namely via shareholders's equity or risk capital and from 
third party lenders or creditors. Each category would, in 
itself, comprise sub-categories. 
■ ■ 
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The question of losses incurred by a taxpayer on capital 
employed can often be addressed by looking, not at the use 
to which the funds were applied, but the nature of the 
funds so applied. Thus, "the true enquiry seems to be to 
determine the function in the taxpayer's hands of the 
money which came to it ... if. that money was held by it on 
revenue account, it is working capital employed by it for 
the purpose of being turned over at a profit, and any loss 
so turning it over would prime facie be deductible." 1 
Further, it has been stated by our courts that: 
"For income tax purposes, borrowed monies are 
colourless in the sense that the amount paid to the 
borrower is, for the borrower neither capital. nor 
income ... regard must be had to the purpose of the 
borrowing and what it actually effects." 2 
Thus, the courts have looked to the sources of finance as 
being indicative of the intention to which the taxpayer 
intended to apply them. The quote from General Motors 
case 2 shows: 
o The first enquiry is into the purpose for which the 
funds were raised ( that is, the intention of the 





o The second enquiry is the effect of the borrowing 
(that is, does the use of the funds support the 
contention made by the taxpayer in regard to the 
stated intention). This enquiry appears to be of an 
objective or factual nature. 
To this end, the above approach is similar to the approach 
adopted by our courts in looking at the source of income 
earned on monies invested. 
For example, in Lever Bros case 3 the court found that the· 
enquiry into the source of income was twofold, namely: 
o The first being to determine the source from which 
income has been received, and when that has been 
determined; 
o To locate it. 
Thus, although the enquiry into the source or capital 
nature of funds raised is fundamentally different, the 
approach is, in many respects, similar. 
There is, however, a presumption that finance raised, even 
if it is by way of a bank overdraft, is prims facie, a 
loan on capital account. In ITC 308 8 SATC 99, Dr Manfred 
KC concluded,. after considering foreign exchange gains 




Kingdom, that "the borrowing of money is prime facie a 
liability on capital account." The resultant gain was 
therefore of a capital nature and tax free. To this end, 
the court looked at the way in which the taxpayer treated 
the liability in supporting this conclusion. 
Thus, loans raised can, subject to the intention of a 
taxpayer, fall into different categories of capital. 
McCreath J, in quoting with approval from Special Court 
judgement in General Motors case• stated: 
"The (first three) loans were certainly not part of 
the company's infrastructure. Rather they were 
directly concerned with producing the revenue 
derived from the manufacture of the finished 
products . .. " 
Although the above case concerned the question of exchange 
losses, it provides insight into the manner in which 
finance raised is viewed by the courts. Where, for 
_example, finance is raised in order to enhance the capital 
structure of an organisation, it will similarly be viewed 
as being of a capital nature; on the other hand, where it 
is raised as circulating capital, it will not form part of 
the company's "infrastructure" and will thus be of a 
revenue nature. The approach of the court in this case 
was to look at the commercial operation as such, and the 
















than the narrow legalistic nature of the transaction 5 • 
(However, where the taxpayer is unable to show a clear 
intention of trading with the finance so raised, the 
courts will, nevertheless, look at the strict legal nature 
of the loan lost, and at the underlying capital nature of 
the amounts so invested 6 .) 
Thus, where a taxpayer is endeavouring to show that its 
business is that of a money lender, the manner in which 
funds have been raised could prove to be an important 
consideration in assessing such a claim. To this end, 
Corbett AJA stated that the fact that a taxpayer used 
borrowed monies to make loans which had become 
irrecoverable "could well have been a relevant factor had 
there been any question of a money lending business being 
carried on but this ... was not the position" 1 
In ITC 1009 • the court reviewed the method in which the 
taxpayer conducted its business. Its principle business 
was that of a cattle auctioneer, in the course of which 
business it made a large number of short term loans to 
farmers, ranches and the like who were purchasing cattle 
from the taxpayer as well as making other lending 
transactions. During the course of this review the court 
noted that the nature of the business required it utilise 
short-term overdraft facilities for a period (when the 
cattle were sold), and during other periods it was self 





and funds so raised on lent at higher rates of interest, 
was regarded as indicative in concluding that the taxpayer 
conducted the business of a money lender. 
On the other hand, where the finance so raised is clearly 
intended to be invested in the capital structure of the 
business, the courts will view losses arising on advances 
made from such capital as themselves being of a capital 
nature. For example, 9 where a company uses its share 
capital to invest by way of money lending transactions and 
the company's articles of association indicate that this 
capital is fixed capital, there will be a presumption that 
the investment so made constituted the utilisation of a 
part of the capital struc.ture of the company. Thus, 
resultant losses, will, themselyes_, be regarded as being 
of a capital nature. 
2.5.2 Application of Funds 
As discussed, the courts have tended to look at the nature 
of the funds invested, rather than the investment itself, 
when determining whether or not loans made are of a 
capital nature. Nevertheless, the application to which 
the funds are put may be used as an indicative factor in 
determining the intention of a taxpayer, with regard to 
the nature of these funds. 




for which the loan was made. Where this purpose is aimed 
at securing a long term right, any subsequent loss will, 
therefore, be of a capital nature. For example, in ITC 
812 1 the taxpayer advanced certain sums to a tennant of 
property owned by him, in order to ensure that the tennant 
would remain on his property and thus the taxpayer would 
continue to earn rental income therefrom. In finding 
against the taxpayer, the court concluded at 476: 
"Even, therefore, if we had been able to find that 
the appellant had been conducting such a business 
(of money lending) it does not follow that we would 
have been prepared to find that these particular 
items could be written off as losses of floating 
capital." 
Thus, it can be concluded from the above case that the 
application of floating capital can convert such capital 
into fixed capital, and, under certain instances, the 
reverse. 
Further, where a loan is advanced in order to secure an 
"advantage of an enduring nature" 2 then the loan so 
advanced will be of a capital nature. As such, any 
resultant losses will, similarly, be of a capital nature. 
Thus, in Harry S Hopkins and Company Pvt Ltd, where 
amounts were advanced to employees in order to secure a 
tennure of service, the courts found that losses incurred 
intervals did not constitute a money lending business, but 
merely reflected the desire by the taxpayer to merely put 
f!I 
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as a result of the employees being unable to repay the 
debt where losses incurred as a result of capital being 
invested to secure a right of an enduring nature and 
therefore represented a loss of fixed capital. 
Where money lending transactions are made, with the view 
of earning interest income (as opposed to securing a right 
from the investment as discussed above), the courts have 
looked at the nature of the investment in assisting them 
to determine the fixed or floating capital nature of the 
investment. Thus, "the habitual use of mortgages would 
indicate a parting with money of a permanent rather than 
a temporary nature." 3 In Salisbury Board of Executors 
case 4 the court looked at the length of time for which 
the funds were invested and concluded that the manner in 
which the funds were applied, as indicated above, did not 
"give the transaction the character of a temporary parting 
with money" . (The court did, however, acknowledge that 
had the taxpayer been a money lender then this factor 
would not necessarily have been relevant.) 
Further, the fact that a taxpayer lends money on a short 
term basis is, similarly, not necessarily relevant where 
the taxpayer has not shown itself to be a money lender. 
Thus, in ITC 1003 5 the court found that the issuing of 
short term promissory notes by a taxpayer at regular 
intervals did not constitute a money lending business, but 





his money to some "short term use". As the underlying 
funds were of a capital nature, the loss arising on an 
advance becoming irrecoverable was, similarly, of a 
capital nature. 
The significance of ITC 1003 lies in the fact that a 
taxpayer can enter into a series of transactions which 
require a systematic monitoring and reinvestment of his 
funds, but this activity may not, under the circumstances, 
be sufficient to constitute a "business of money lending". 
In order to demonstrate that such a business is being 
conducted, a taxpayer will be required to show the clear 
intention of embarking and carrying on such a business if 
losses incurred during the course of these transactions 
are to be regarded as a losses arising out of a money 
lending business. 
For example, ITC 257 concerned a taxpayer who derived his 
income from interest, directors fees and rents. Amongst 
other ways of investing his capital, he lent money on 
promissory notes for periods of approximately four months. 
In commenting on a loss made by the taxpayer as a result 
of a promissory note proving irrecoverable, Dr Manfred 
Nathan KC stated, at 66: 
"The appellant does not deal in promissory notes, 
and there is no evidence before us that he buys and 




conclusion that so far as the evidence before us 
shows the transaction is that of an ordinary loan of 
money and the security of a promissory note carrying 
interest ... The capital invested in effect is really 
fixed capital .... and it does not appear to differ 
from money put out on a fixed deposit or from money 
lent on security of a mortgage bond." 
Further, in commenting on the period (being four months) 
of the loan, the judge did not feel that this was 
significant. 
Where, however, a taxpayer utilises its resources to offer 
finance to purchasers of its goods and services, and these 
purchasers (debtors) subsequently fail to honour their 
commitments, any such losses will be deductible in terms 
of Section ll(i) of the Act, subject to the provisions of 
that section. Notwithstanding this, it would appear that 
a loss arising as a result of a debtor failing to pay 
amounts due would be floating capital, and therefore 
deductible. The converse of this (being bills given to a 
taxpayer's creditors) was considered in ITC 308 6 • The 
court found that gains made as a result of favourable 
exchange rate fluctuations on trading bills given in the 
course of trading were connected with the trade and such 
gains were therefore taxable. 




by a South African taxpayer on trading bills issued in the 
United Kingdom as a result of exchange rate fluctuations, 
it would appear that the principle contained therein is 
applicable to the matter in question. 
Where, however, a taxpayer can show that loans were made 
as part and parcel of its existing business, with the 
intention of securing an advantage of a revenue nature, 
any losses incurred may be losses on a revenue account and 
therefore deductible 7 • In this regard, the courts have 
looked to "the para.mount motive which operated upon the 
mind of the lender in entering into the agreement" 8 
Thus, for example, where a category of taxpayers, such as 
shippers, make loans to their c_lients in the ordinary 
course of their business, losses incurred as a result of 
clients subsequently being unable· to honour loans made 
will be regarded as being losses of floating capital, and 
- therefore deductible. Where the funds are therefore 
applied in the course of a taxpayer's normal business 
operations, any losses will, similarly, be regarded as 
"normal" and therefore be deductible. In ITC 434 9 Dr 
Manfred Nathan KC concluded: 
"These transactions (being advances to clients of 
shippers) were in their nature in the ordinary 
course of the appellant firm's business. That being 
the case, it is clear that these transactions were 
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on income account... In these circumstances, the 
court must allow the appeals as to the deduction of 
what has been described as a doubtful debt though it 
is really a bad debt." 
Further, where a taxpayer can show ( even though the 
practice of advancing funds to customers, clients, 
suppliers or the like is not normal for that kind of 
business) that advances are made in the manner adopted by 
the taxpayer to conduct its specific business, losses will 
be allowed where they are incurred on monies advanced, 
providing the advances are attached to the revenue 
operations of the company. 
Thus, where there is evidence to show that it is a custom 
of a company to carry on the business of lenders of money 
as an adjunct of their business 4, then losses resulting 
on such loans will not be regarded as being of a capital 
nature. 
In ITC 807 10 the taxpayer carried on the business of a 
wholesale merchant. In order to overcome difficulties 
obtained in securing supplies of certain goods, it 
purchased shares in a company engaged in the manufacture 
of such goods, and made cash advances to that company. 
The cash advances were made in order to secure a supply of 
the required goods. Following the collapse of the 
company, the advances proved irrecoverable. In finding 
for the taxpayer, Price J stated, at 341: 
"It seems to me that it is not essential to find 
that the making of advances is a customary way of 
carrying on the kind of business carried on by the 
appellant, so long as it has been shown to have been 
the way in which the appellant itself carried on its 
business... The real question is, how does the 
appellant carry on its business, not how do other 
people carry on their businesses." 
2.5.3 Nature of Security Required 
General 
As discussed in Part I, a contract of loan creates 
personal rights, with each party being at the same time 
the debtor and creditor of the other party. In the normal 
course of events, the non-performance by the borrower of 
his duties in terms of a loan agreement would simply give 
the lender certain contractual rights; the lender's 
remedies under these circumstances may take time and prov.e 
valueless. Such a right may be extended by the lender 
seeking additional security through a suretyship obtained 
from a third party. The lender may wish to have security 
in addition to any personal rights obtained and acquire a 
real right (that is, "a right in a thing which is good 
against the world" 1) in the form of a mortgage, pledge, 











Any such security is an accessory to the obligation 
secured, and in the absence of such an obligation a 
security cannot exist. 2 
From a statutory point of view, the above securities 
require certain formalities are to be met before they will 
be recognised by a court of law. For example, in the case 
of suretyship, Section 6 of the General Law Amendment Act 
50 of 1956 (as amended) requires that a contract of 
suretyship be embodied in a written document signed by, or 
on behalf of, the surety; and a mortgage bond over 
immovable property requires registration of such a bond. 
Income Tax Considerations 
The issue of security has been defined as "a usual, though 
not essential, feature of a loan made in the course of a 
money lending business" 1 
Notwithstanding the discussion under "General", the 
question of what security is from a tax point of view, and 
the importance placed upon it, has been vague and 
contradictory. For example, in ITC 1138 2 the court 
commented that no security was requested or obtained in 
regard to certain loans made, which loans were the subject 
of a promissory note. On the other hand, ITC 1009 3 
indicated that the use of a promissory note was a form of 
security. In this regard, it would appear that the former 
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case was looking to tangible security whereas the latter 
accepted an acknowledgement of debt as such security. 
Regarding the actual effect of security, in Salisbury 
Board of Executors Limited's case 4 the court commented 
that the obtaining of a real right via a mortgage bond 
represented the acquisition of a "capital" asset, and this 
asset was acquired in exchange for funds advanced. Thus, 
as the asset acquired was of a long term or enduring 
nature, funds advanced to secure this asset were similarly 
of such a nature. 
Further, the Court in ITC 1009 supra, considered a 
taxpayer's long acquaintance with people to whom funds 
were advanced to be a form of security and in Fairway 
Estate's case 5 , an Australian decision, the Court noted 
that the insistence on a seat on the board of directors of 
the debtor was taken as a means of "participating in the 
control of the borrowing company's affairs by way of 
security for the money advanced". Whereas in ITC 807 6 
the court commented that an advance to a company in which 
the taxpayer held shares, represented an unsecured loan. 
Notwithstanding the above, the question to be addressed 
is: does the taking of security, and the nature of the 
security obtained, impact the taxpayer's contention that 
it is carrying on a business of a money lender? 
·----!!!!!!!!!1!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1-----------------
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The answer to this question would appear to be to look at, 
firstly what is normal for a particular taxpayer's kind of 
business, and secondly how that taxpayer elects to conduct 
its own business (as discussed in 2.5.2 above). 
The taking of security is, most certainly, a normal 
prerequisite for any money lending transaction. It would, 
however, appear that in Salisbury Board of Executors 
Limited's case supra the court viewed the taking of 
security as predominant in the taxpayer's mind and it was 
this asset (being the mortgage) which gave rise to the 
income generated, rather than the loan itself. On the 
other hand, a money lender would have viewed such security 
as a normal business requirement, and not an end to 
itself. 
The degree to which security is required would, it is 
considered, be dependent on a number of variables. For 
example, where a taxpayer has an in depth knowledge of a 
particular borrower, security requirements may be lesser 
where a particular client is of good standing, when 
compared to another party about whose affairs the taxpayer 
has little knowledge. Such factors would, as already 
discussed, be indicative of the nature of the taxpayer's 
business, rather than decisive. 
The conclusion to be drawn from the above cases is that 
security taken, and the nature thereof, will provide 
T a;u;z_MJ 
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evidence to support a taxpayer's stated intention, rather 
than contradict it. Thus, security is one of the factors 
to be considered when concluding on whether or not a 
taxpayer is carrying on the business of money lending in 
the light of other complementary factors . 
• £ 
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EXPENDITURE (AND LOSSES) WHOLLY OR EXCLUSIVEL¥ 
LAID OUT FOR THE PURPOSES OF TRADE 
1. GENERAL 
As discussed under "General" in Part II, for any loss to be 
deductible, it must meet the conditions laid down in the "generci.l 
deduction formula". An integral part of this formula is the 
provisions of Section 23 (g). Thus, what Section ll(a) provides 
positively, Section 23(g) provides negatively 1 • Section 23(g) reads: 
"23 No deduction shall in any case be made in respect of the 
following matters, namely -
(g) any moneys claimed as a deduction from income derived from 
trade, which are not wholly or exclusively laid out or 
expended for the purposes of trade_;" 
In Solaglass' case 2 the courts have, at 16, described and analysed 
Section 23(g) as follows: 
"The prohibition is of wide ambit. This can be seen when that 
against which the prohibition is directed is dissected into its 




(ii) in respect of 
(iii) any moneys 
(iv) claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade 
(v) which are not wholly or exclusively laid out for the 
purposes of trade." 
1.1 LOSSES 
As discussed in Part II, irrecoverable loans represent losses 
incurred by a taxpayer. In Solaglass' case supra counsel for 
the appellant argued that Section 23(g) did not apply to losses 
as it only referred to moneys claimed as a deduction from 
income. 
In commenting on the taxpayer's contention, the court stated, at 
16: 
"The expression in itself is not concerned with "losses", 
neither inclusively or exclusively; it is entirely neutral 
in relation to the concept of "losses" ... Re-casting it 
(Section 23 (g)) in positive terms, the requirement is that 
any moneys sought to be deducted must be moneys which are 
laid out or expended in the manner specified. The 
requirement comprises two component notions: 
.(a) Moneys which are laid our or expended; and 
(b) In a particular manner, i.e. wholly and exclusively 
83 
for the purposes of trade. 
But the requirement in no way touches upon the question 
whether moneys which are laid out or expended have been 
lost or not. That is immaterial for the purposes of this 
section, according to its wording ... There is nothing in 
this section to support the argument that the prohibition 
does not apply when moneys which are laid out or expended 
happen to reiult in losses." 
Thus, the judge went on to conclude that the fact that moneys 
were lost, did not preclude them from falling within the ambit 
of Section 23(g). In fact, it was apparent that moneys had been 
expended by way of making a loan in a previous tax year. 
Regarding the annuality of a taxpayer's affairs, _the judge 
passed no comment; this factor was not, it would appear, 
considered relevant, notwithstanding the decision in 
Concentra's case I where it was held that expenditure and losses 
are to be brought to account at a year end. Thus , one can 
conclude that Section 23 (g) is not restricted to expenditure 
incurred in the year of assessment, but refers to any 
expenditure incurred by the taxpayer in the current or previous 
years of assessment. Precedent for such an approach would 
appear to arise from De Beer's case 2 • This case concerned the 
deductibility of certain shares classified as trading stock up 
to and including 1979, when they were purchased in 1973. In 
addressing the question of the effect of Section 23(g) on the 
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1973 assessment Corbett JA commented; 
"The consequences of finding that Section 23 (g) precluded 
the deduction of the purchase price of the shares on the 
1973 assessment do not arise for decision." 
In this regard, the fact that the "deduction" in the 1979 year 
of assessment arose through an "automatic" claim as opening 
stock (Section 22 of the Act) and not as a result of expenditure 
was not, it would appear, considered relevant. Thus, the court, 
in considering whether or not a loss on the sale of such trading 
stock (arising as a result of Section 22) was deductible in year 
so incurred, even if the amounts expended in acquiring such 
stock were expended in a previous year of assessment, found that 
Section 23(g) was applicable. (In the alternative, the court 
found that the shares should never have, in the first instance, 
been classified as trading stock.) 
In applying the above principle to transactions involving losses 
arising on loans advanced, the following is apparent: 
o If it were to be argued that Section 23 (g) is not 
applicable to the losses, then it would be apparent that 
the nature of the intended benefit of the transaction 
(that is non-taxable interest earned, trade generated or 
the like) would nevertheless disqualify the loss as a 
deduction as it falls outside the ambit of the word 





supra, the cost of the shares claimed as a deduction in 
1973 should never have in the first instance, been 
regarded as stock in trade; or 
o Alternatively, if the losses are as a result of the 
taxpayer's money lending business, then the year in which 
the expenditure was so made would appear to be irrelevant 
and any such losses would be as a result of moneys 
expended thus falling outside the ambit of Section 23(g), 
thereby qualifying as a deduction. 
0 Finally, if the granting of the advance is not 
"expenditure", the incurral of the loss is. 
1.2 WHOLLY OR EXCLUSIVELY 
The phrase "wholly or exclusively" would appear to be the focus 
of most enquiries when considering the implications of Section 
23(g) on the deductibility of irrecoverable loans for income tax 
purposes. To this end, and as discussed in Part II, there 
appear to be two fundamental enquiries, namely: 
o Whether or not a taxpayer was carrying on the business of 
money lending; and 
o If the taxpayer was carrying on such a business, was the 
loan in question advanced in the course of that business. 
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Although earlier cases do not make reference to Section 23(g) 
(or that sections predecessor 1), frequently concluding that 
loans advanced outside the scope of a taxpayer's business are of 
a capital nature or were not advanced in order to produce 
income, it would appear that the enquiry was frequently into the 
purpose for which the loan was made; that is, was it "wholly or 
exclusively laid out for the purposes of trade"? It would 
further appear that such an enquiry should have properly been 
conducted within the ambit of what is now Section 23(g). This 
phrase was considered in Pick 'n Pay's case 2 • In analysing the 
term, Nicholas AJA at 147, commented: 
"The first question to be considered is the meaning of the 
words 'moneys' . . . which are not wholly or exclusively 
laid out or expended for the purposes of trade." 
The answer was provided by the analysis of similar words 
in the judgement of Romer LJ in Bentley, Stocks and Lowess 
v Benson (1952) 33 TC 491 ... " 
The above judgement concluded as follows: 
o "Wholly" is in reference to the quantum of the money 
expended; 
o "Exclusively" refers to the motive or object in the mind 
of the (two) individuals responsible for the activities in 
question. 
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In proceeding with his judgement, Nicholas AJA went on to state, 
at 149: 
"The question is one of fact, the fact of the state of 
mind of those responsible for making the donation at the 
time it was made." 
It is important to note the disinction between the wording of 
Section 23 (g) and the wording of the United Kingdom statute 
quoted. The South African Statute refers to "wholly or 
exclusively", whereas the United Kingdom statute refers to 
"wholly and exclusively". From the above quote, it is apparent 
that this distinction has been ignored by our courts and the 
enquiry has been into the state of mind of the taxpayer as well 
as the expenditure in question. Thus, even if the amount 
expended was expended wholly for the purposes of trade, yet 
there was an altruisic motive in making such expenditure, the 
prohibition provided by Section 23 would be applied. The courts 
failure to acknowledge the difference in the wording was noted 
in Solaglass' case ◄ 
In commenting on the judgement of Solaglass' case 3 , and the 
courts interpretation of Section 23(g) the authors, with 
reference to the relevance of the said section, argued that it 
is redundant and that "it is obviously most undesirable that 
practice should differ from the law"; it would, in addition, 
appear equally undesirable where the court's application of the 




The authors argument for redundancy arises from the ability to 
apportion expenditure in terms of Section 11 ( a) . Such an 
apportionment may not be necessary if Section 23(g) were to be 
applied in two parts; thus were the expenditure in question to 
be measured against the both "wholly and exclusively", and only 
it if failed both, would such a disqualification arise. Thus, 
the word "wholly" appears to have been overlooked and could 
itself be viewed as being redundant. The Court's emphasis in 
this regard has been on whether or not expenditure. was 
"exclusively" laid out for the purposes of trade. 
As indicated in Pick 'n Pay's case above, the question necessary 
to determine whether the contemplated expenditure was 
exclusively laid out for business purposes is: what was the 
motive or objective in the mind of the individual responsible 
for the activity in question? 
In Solaglass' case 4 Botha JA commented, on the distinction 
between motive and purpose, as follows: 
"So, for instance, the distinction between motive and 
purpose in this context seems to me to be a nebulous one: 
it may sometimes be found to be helpful, but at other 
times it may be conducive more to confusion that to 
clarity ... The truth is, in my judgement, that there are 
no hard and fast rules for deciding whether a taxpayer's 
expenditure falls within or outside the ambit of this 
section; it is not possible to devise any precise 
•• 
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universal test for determining whether expenditure 
comprises moneys 'exclusively laid out or expended for the 
purposes of trade'. In general, one can say no more than 
that the issue is to be resolved by examining the 
particular facts of each individual case." 
In finding against the taxpayer, Botha JA looked at the link 
between Solaglass' business and that of fellow subsidiaries. He 
commented, at 20: 
"If it is accepted that in the latter situations the 
benefits are too remotely connected with the trading 
activities to be brought home under the word "purpose" in 
this section, I am nevertheless satisfied that the link 
between the appellant's activities and the furthering of 
the group's -interests is sufficiently close, on the 
evidence, to cause the latter to fall within the ambit of 
the word "purposes" as used in this section." 
It would, therefore, appear that the court looked to factors 
both internal and external to the taxpayer to determine not only 
the nature of its business, but reason for existence. As the 
reason for its existence was not to trade as a money lender, but 
to serve an administrative function for the Plate Glass Group, 
losses incurred by it on loans advanced to fellow subsidiaries 
were precluded from its taxable income as a deduction, 
notwithstanding the courts finding that it carried on a business 
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similar to that found in Plate Glass' 5 where, at 112, the court 
found that certain loans raised by the company were raised for 
"the specific purpose of making such (loans) available to 
certain importers in. the group... and (the loans) were not 
raised to enable the appellant to trade. The money was nothing 
more or less than capital raised .... for use by companies in 
that group and the appellant's receipt or administration of the 
money was for that purpose and not for its self." ' 
Thus, where a taxpayer is engaged in a business of money 
lending, as was Solaglass 4 and the taxpayer in ITC 1009 6 
(discussed in Part II), the courts will endeavour to analyse the 
specific reasons for which the loan transactions were entered 
into. In the case of Solaglass, the court found that the 
business itself, although being that of a money lender, would 
not warrant the deductibility of losses as the reason for its 
existence was mixed, namely to trade at a profit, and to assist 
the group. On the other hand, the taxpayer in ITC 1009 made 
certain advances to a club, which advances were made for 
purposes not exclusively related to trade; the fact that this 
loan proved irrecoverable did not, it would appear,. affect the 
taxpayer's right to claim as a deduction any other losses 
resulting from its money lending business. 
What is interesting to note in Solaglass' case 7 is the fact that 
the courts accepted that operating expenditure attendent on its 
business continued to be deductible, thus differentiating such 





In commenting on this distinction, Botha JA 
"One would have to examine the nature of the activities 
carried on, the nature of the expenditure, and the 
closeness (or remoteness) of the connection between the 
expenditure and the benefit derived therefrom from the 
group. For example: in the present case the appellant 
presumably incurred ordinary day to day expenses in the 
running of its business... There is no doubt that the 
deduction of such expenses from the appellant's income is 
not precluded by Section 23(g). The reason for this is 
that the connection between such expenditure and the 
benefit to the group flowing from the appellant's 
activities is too remote for the latter to qualify as a 
'purpose' in terms of this section. But the appellant's 
expenditure in the form of loans advanced to subsidiairies 
in the group stands on quite a different footing. Such 
expenditure is a part and parcel essential substance, in 
fact, of the very activities which were designed and 
carried out in order to benefit the group. The connection 
between this expenditure and this benefit is both direct 
and immediate. In these particular circumstances the 
'benefit' falls within the ambit of the word 'purpose' in 
the section" 
Thus, it would appear that the enquiry into the ambit of Section 23(g) 
is not only directed towards the purpose for which expenditure was 
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made, but also the closeness of the link between the expenditure, and 
income earned. Where the activities flowing from the expenditure so 
incurred are too remote to be a 'purpose' not related to trade, then 
the expenditure incurred is probably deductible; where, however, the 
expenditure (or loss in this case) is directly linked to the purpose 
then the provisions of Section 23(g) apply. 
The distinction in thus one of degree which is confusing and one which 
is likely to create uncertainty, rather than lead to clarity. 
Notwithstanding the above, it would appear that the phrase "wholly or 
exclusively" should be analysed thus: 
o The expenditure should first be examined in order to ascertain 
if it was "wholly" laid out for trade; 
o Assuming it was, the purpose motivating the laying out of the 
funds in question is to be ascertained; 
o If this purpose is directly linked to a trade of the taxpayer, 
notwithstanding the fact that the taxpayer's activities may have 
been entered into with a dual motive, namely to trade and to 
benefit a third party, then the attendant expenditure may 
nevertheless be deductible; or 
o If the expenditure (or loss) is so closely linked to the 
taxpayer's dual motive, so as to be indistinguishable from the 







will be precluded by Section 23(g) from qualifying as a 
deduction for income tax purposes. 
The above principle, although not articulated by the courts prior to 
the cases referred to above, appears to have been consistently 
appiied. In this regard Watermeyer AJP 8 noted that the question of 
whether an item of expenditure was incurred "in the production of 
income" is "the same one as is dealt with negatively in Section 13 (b) 
(Section 23(g), which prohibits a deduction unless the expenditure is 
made 'wholly and exclusively for the purposes of trade'". 
For example ITC 44 9 concerned a company which guaranteed certain loans 
owing by a third party building contractor in order to obtain work 
from the contractor. The guarantees were subsequently called up and 
the taxpayer was not allowed to deduct the resultant losses as the 
court found that the granting of guarantees fell outside its scope of -
business. 
2. CORPORATE VEIL 
It is notew~rthy that, in the Pick 'n Pay. Plate Glass and Solaglass' 
cases referred to above, the courts have tended to look beyond the 
immediate framework in which the taxpayer operated to factors external 
to it, when concluding that certain transactions were entered into for 
reasons other than pure trade. In all of these cases they have looked 
to the motives of the shareholders and found that the shareholders' 




This finding was made notwithstanding evidence led by executive 
directors of the taxpayer. For example, in Pick 'n Pay's case 1 the 
financial director of the company stated: 
"We are a very aggressive company. Our advertising is extremely 
aggressive in particular we work tremendously hard on this 
public relations aspect... It is all part of the public 
relations .. part of advertising 
event advertising campaign." 
it was just like a special 
And, in Solaglass' case 2 a director of the company described 
operations of the company thus: 
"In the structure and design of the method whereby it performed 
this function (the money lending function) it sought at all 
times to make a profit .... " -
It is, it is considered, appropriate for the courts to look to those 
parties responsible for the day to day operations of a company in 
determining the intention with which transactions were entered into. 
In Trust Bank's case 3, which case concerned the capital or revenue 
nature of an investment disposed of, the court stated: 
"The respondent being a company, the special court held that its 
intention in regard to the share transaction in question had to 
be sought in the thoughts and acts of the persons who manage and 
control its affairs. That would ultimately be the board of 
directors but, because the evidence showed that considerable 
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powers were conferred by the board u o th p n e management 
committee ... the special court concluded that the intention of 
the management committee would, to some extent, depending upon 
the nature of the matter and the circumstances, represent the 
intention of the company ... " 
As already indicated, the courts have, notwithstanding the comments of 
management, and its finding in Trust Bank's case supra, looked beyond 
the immediate realms of a taxpayer's affairs in determining the 
purposes for which money has been expended. The approach taken in 
Pick 'n Pay's case and Solaglass' case deviates from the previously 
accepted norm wherein the courts looked at specific transactions, and 
the factors motivating them, rather than looking at the purpose for 
which a taxpayer was formed and using the conclusion of such an 
observation to comment on the specific transaction. Such an approach 
may, it is considered, ~gnore the dynamic nature of a modern company's 
objects, as these objects change over time. 
In Solaglass' case, for example, the company may have been 
administratively orientated at its inception but over time became 
profit orientated. Such a change is contemplated within Section 33 of 
the Companies Act~- Section 33(3) of the said Act provides: 
"Notwithstanding anything contained in the memorandum of any 
existing company, the main business which it actually carried 
on ... shall be deemed to be its main object." 
Such an approach has, nevertheless, been adopted by the courts in the 
I - ?4EL,........,, -
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past. For example, in Richmond Estate's case 5 the courts stated that 
"a company is an artificial person with no body to kick and no soul to 
damn no ifs and the only way of ascertaining its intention is to find 
out what its directors acting as such intended ... " 
In this case, as the director was the sole shareholder, the court felt 
that it was competent to say that the mind of the shareholder was also 
the mind of the company. 
The above principle was further expanded in Elandsheuwel 's case 6 where 
the courts found that a company changed its intention as a result of 
a change of shareholders. Thus, the company which had held land for 
a number of years as a capital asset, was found to have changed its 
intention with reference to that land and its subsequent disposal was 
a disposal of trading stock and therefore taxable. 
Although various branches of commercial law may accept the principle 
that a taxpayer is a separate juristic person, as was strongly argued 
in Plate Glass's case, income tax law does not appear to fully accept 
this principle when examining the intention with which a taxpayer has 
entered into a transaction. Thus, the courts will look, not only at 
the immediate acts of the parties responsible for implementing and 
carrying on a transaction, but also the reasons why the business 
itself was formulated, and therefore, the motives of its shareholders, 
even where these shareholders may be passive and uninvolved with 
management. Thus, in Pick 'n Pay's case it would appear that Mr 
Raymond Ackermann's (indirect) controlling of the affairs of Pick 'n 
Pay was a significant factor in the finding that the "donation" . by 
.. • 
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Pick 'n Pay had a dual purpose, one of which was philanthropic. This 
dual purpose was sufficient to disqualify the donation as not being 
wholly or exclusively expended for the purposes of trade. 
A slightly contradictory approach was adopted in ITC 1321 1 where the 
courts held that a taxpayer who had invested in a company by way of 
shares and loan accounts in order to fund a company which acquired and 
developed immovable property was precluded from deducting the loss 
incurred on the subsequent realisation of the shares and loan· accounts 
as it was; in their view, the company that was trading and not the 
appellant. This case, however, indicates that the direction of the 
court's enquiry has been from the shareholders to the company, rather 
than the other way around . 
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As noted in Part II of this report, part of the general deduction 
formula requires that a loss arising from an irrecoverable loan be 
"actually incurred" before it can qualify as a deduction in terms of 
Section ll(a), read with Section 23(g). 
Discussing the meaning of "actually incurred", Watermeyer AJP I stated: 
"that expenses actually incurred cannot mean actually paid. So 
long as the liability to pay them has actually been incurred 
they may be deductible". 
In applying the above (which is accepted as a general principle from 
an interpretative point of view) so long as losses have actually 
arisen, even though they may not yet have been funded, they will be 
incurred for the purposes of Section ll(a). Thus, where these losses 
arise in a particular year of assessment, they have been actually 
incurred in that year of assessment, notwithstanding the fact that a 
taxpayer may only be required to pay for these losses at a future date 
(for example, by way of honouring guarantees) or only be entitled to 
receive the repayment of an advance at a future date. In Caltex Oil's 




"It is in the tax year in which the liability for the 
expenditure is incurred, and not the tax year in which it is 
actually paid (if paid in a subsequent year), that the 
expenditure is actually incurred for the purposes of Section 
ll(a)." 
This principle has been upheld in so far as it applies to losses. In 
this regard, Plate Glass case 3 extended the reference to "expenditure" 
in the above quote from Caltex Oil's case to include 'expenditure and 
losses' actually incurred. 
The practical aspects relating to a claim of this nature were 
discussed by C Divaris 4 wherein he commented: 
"The difficulty,of course, lies in regarding a loss as being 
payable ... - The liability to pay attaches to the loan and not 
the loss. When the times comes for payment a loss may be 
suffered, but when was that loss incurred? ... " 
Divaris was referring to the deductibility of losses incurred as a 
result of exchange rate fluctuations on loans owing by a taxpayer. 
Nevertheless, the comments made would appear to be relevant as great 
difficulty may be experienced by a taxpayer in ascertaining exactly 
when a loss is either incurred, or to be recognised. Thus, the 
affairs of the debtor of a taxpayer may deteriorate over a period of 
time, with the value of the debt diminishing; the date at which the 
taxpayer finally acknowledges that the debt is no longer worth its 





loss was actually suffered. 
In discussing the concept of "incurred" with reference to losses in 
ITC 1218 5 , the court made the following comments: 
o 'Incurred' means either 'paid' or 'become liable for'; 
o The words 'expenditure actually incurred' seem to be to mean: 
(1) moneys actually paid out; or 
(2) moneys which a trader is legally liable to pay. 
Applying the above to the concept of a loss of the nature envisaged, 
the term incurred could read 'no longer recoverable'(by a trader) (as 
compared with 'become liable for'). 
The distinction between a mere provisions and an actual loss is, 
notwithstanding the importance attached to recognising the timing of 
the loss, relevant. A provision for expected or anticipated losses 
will be disqualified as a deduction in view of Section 23(f) which 
prohibits the deduction of "income. carried to any reserve fund ... " 
(that is, provisions created for anticipated losses) (See Part V). 
2. DURING THE YEAR OF ASSESSMENT 
In Concentra's case 6 , which case concerned the question of whether 
expenditure incurred by the taxpayer's directors on its behalf, but 
only submitted to it subsequent to the year end, was deductible in the 
year submitted, the court, in finding against the taxpayer stated: 
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"From the wording of the Act it is clear that the intention of 
the legislature was to fix some definite day in the pa.st on 
which the assets employed in trade of all persons should be 
ascertained and it cannot be limited to assets employed on the 
whole of the day unless so expressed. The definition seems to 
me to cover all assets employed a.t any time on that day." 
Thus, the principle identified in Concentra 's case requires that 
expenditure (and thus losses, based on the comments made in Plate 
Glass's case 3 with reference to the decision in Caltex Oil case 2 ) be 
deducted as and when it is actually incurred. Thus, it would appear 
that it is important for taxpayers involved in money lending 
businesses to objectively assess the recoverability of debts due to 
them at the end of each year in order to ascertain whether any losses 
have been "incurred" during that year of assessment and to claim as a 
deduction any portion of those debts which are likely to prove 
irrecoverable. (See Part V.) 
3. INCURRED 
The actual incurral of a loss does not appear to have been directly 
considered by the Courts when deciding on income tax matters. Thus 
the question of what is incurred (when referring to losses) remains 
open. The issue appears uncertain as a taxpayer's affairs are 
frequently subjected to changing fortunes. For example, the debtor of 
a money lender may, in one year, be operating under insolvent or near 
insolvent conditions and the following year reflect a strong financial 
position; or a debtor with apparently healthy financial affairs may be 
II 
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the victim of some vagary which could result in its inability to 
continue trading. 
From an accounting point of view, financial statements are prepared on 
the assumption that the business is a "going concern" unless there is 
clear evidence to the contrary 7 ; that is, that it will continue as a 
viable entity into the foreseeable future. Thus, financial statements 
may not reflect the realistic value of a business, but merely its 
historical cost. 
In considering the above, the expectation that a business is a "going 
concern" presumes that it will be in a position to meet its financial 
commitments. Thus, a debtor which is experiencing financial 
difficulties may not necessarily generate a loss. From the money 
lender's point of view accounting "prudence" 8 may, under these 
circumstances, require a loss be anticipated and thus provided for but 
tax parlance may not recognise the incurral of such a loss. The 
question is thus: 
incurred? 
when does an anticipated loss become a loss 
There is, to a limited degree, precedent in using the accounting 
approach to the recognition of certain items of income and expenditure 
where the actual receipt (or incurral) is derived over a period of 
time. 
For example, in X Co (Pty) Limited 9 , which case concerned the 
taxability of a surplus arising on the repayment of debts purchased at 
a discount, the court stated: 
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"The question remains, however, whether the Commissioner has 
right in assessing the amount of taxable income at $4,923. That 
depends on whether the Commissioner should have taken the actual 
surplus received by X Co, $998, as representing the prof it 
arising during the relevant income year from the carrying out of 
the scheme, or whether he was entitled to assess the profit on 
an ongoing basis. In the absence of some definite direction in 
the Act, the Commissioner should, in the assessment of income, 
adopt the method of accounting which is in fact appropriate to 
the circumstances of the case, or which in other words 'is 
calculated to give a substantially correct reflex of the 
taxpayer's true income' ... " 
Similarly, and with reference to losses Margo J Stated in Plate Glass 
case 10 • 
" ... it seems to me that there is logic is adopting the 
accounting method to determine liabilities or losses, whether on 
capital account as set forth in a balance sheet as at a 
particular date, or on a trading account covering a particular 
period ... " 
Notwithstanding the above, it is considered that there is no incurral 
of a loss until the debtor is in default, as discussed in 3.1 or some 
other factor intervenes as discussed in 3.2. Thus, incurred has been 
defined 5 as meaning either "paid" or "become liable for"; in this 
context it would mean a receipt to which the lender is unconditionally 
"entitled to 11 ", but which receipt is irrecoverable. 
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The recognition of such a loss could therefore flow from one of two 
eventualities: 
o The acts of the debtor vis a· vis the money lender; or 
o The acts of parties external to both the debtor and the money 
lender. 
3.1 DEBTOR MONEY/LENDER DUTIES 
In dealing with the relationship between the debtor and the 
money lender, the relationship would be covered by a contract 
(formally or informally) concluded between the two parties. 
A contract has been described thus: 
" ... a lawful agreement, made by two or more persons within the 
limits of their contractual capacity, with the serious intention 
of creating a legal obligation, communicating such intention, 
without vagueness, each to the other and being of the same mind 
as to the subject matter, to perform positive or negative acts 
which are possible of performance". 1 
Thus, and with reference to losses, the concepts of "legal 
obligation", and "performance" are crucial. To this end, it 
would appear that until there is non-performance by the debtor 
there can be no breach of the debtor's legal obligation; as such 
there can (subject to 3.2) be no loss until the contract has 
i 
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been breached. To this end, it has been assumed that the non-
payment of an amount due in terms of a loan agreement (be it 
interest or capital) is a breach of a material condition of that 
agreement. 
In the event of there being a breach of the contract, the money 
lender can either: 
o Treat the contract as cancelled; or 
0 Sue for specific performance. 2 
(In reality, however, a money lender may be reluctant to pursue 
these actions as further losses may be incurred.) 
Thus, as it is only at the time of non-performance that a debtor 
is in breach of its contract, would it appear that it is only at 
this stage that a loss can be regarded as being "incurred". 
Further, the fact that a debtor may not elect to cancel the 
contract or sue for specific performance or damages does not, it 
is considered, affect this principle. The election to permit a 
debtor to default on certain payments may, for valid commercial 
reasons, be necessary to protect the entire debt due; as an 
insistence on the payment of an amount at a particular time may 
prejudice the entirety. 
One can therefore conclude as follows: 
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o The mere fact that a money lender is suspicious about a 
debtor's ability to fund payments due in the future is not 
sufficient to conclude that a loss has been incurred; 
o In the event of the debtor failing to pay an installment, 
be it of interest or capital, the entire contract is 
voidable. As such, a "loss" has been incurred. 
o When a loss has been incurred, it would appear that the 
money lender would be entitled to value the entire debt 
due and claim, as a loss, the difference between the face 
value of the debt and its estimated realisable value. To 
this end, the money lender must be able to show that the 
question of the loss claimed has been considered with 
reference to extraneous factors, such as suretyships given 
by third parties. 
The question of whether a loss was actually incurred was 
discussed in ITC 1138 3 • This case concerned loans advanced to 
a company, which loans were guaranteed by directors of this 
company. The guarantee was evidenced by the endorsement of a 
promissory note given to the taxpayer by the company. On the 
company becoming unable to repay the loan, the debt was claimed 
as bad. The taxpayer did not appear to attempt to recover the 
loans advanced from the directors who guaranteed payment. 




"There was no evidence before me to establish that the 
appellant was precluded from proceeding against these 
directors or that, if it did so, it would not be able to 
recover the sum from them. 
As no proceedings were taken for the recovery of this 
sum ... the appellant has not established that the sum is 
irrecoverable. This being so, it is my opinion that the 
appellant has not established that it suffered a loss ... " 
Based on the above, it can be seen that the following approach 
has been adopted by the court in analysing whether in fact a 
loss had been incurred: 
o The first enquiry is into the ability of the debtor to 
fund the repayment of the loan raised; 
o If the debtor is unable to meet this liability, the ~ourts 
will look to see if the taxpayer has alternative recourse; 
o If such alternative avenue is available, the taxpayer will 
need to ascertain whether or not its pursuance of that 
avenue will result in the loss being recovered. 
Failing the above, the court will find that no loss has, in 
fact, been incurred. 
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3.2 EXTERNAL FACTORS 
Notwithstanding the above, it would appear that a money lender 
can claim a loss has been incurred where extraneous factors 
indicate that a debtor will not be able to fund payments due in 
the future, even though there may be no immediate obligation to 
make such a payment. 
For example, a declaration of insolvency by a debtor, or its 
liquidation could give rise to a loss. 
3.3 CONSTRAINTS SPECIFIC TO MONEY LENDERS 
Where, for various reasons unrelated to the debtor, a money 
lender is of the opinion that a loss has been incurred, the 
Courts may accede to such a claim where it can be shown that for 
all practical purposes a loss has been suffered. 
Where, however, a loss is voluntarily for non- trade related 
reasons incurred, it will not be admitted. In commenting on the 
action required by a taxpayer to prove a loss, the court stated 
in Cathart 's case 1 • 
"In the present case, as I have pointed out, the taxpayer 
has nowhere said that he paid because he was liable to 
pay. In fact, in his statement of case before the special 
court, he makes reference to the fact that the legal 
proceedings in question were to be lengthy and 
I 
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expensive ... In other words he takes up the attitude that 
the reason for admitting the claim is irrelevant; all that 
matters is that he has in fact made the payment ... It 
does not seem to me that the learned Judge President (of 
the special court) was justified in drawing the inference 
that the sum paid in settlement was paid in pursuance of 
a legal liability." 
Cathcart was an architect who had given certain warranties with 
regard to a building designed and developed by him. Following 
certain claims made by the owner of the building, Cathcart 
agreed to pay a sum representing damages. It was this claim for 
damages that was considered by the courts. 
In applying the above principle to losses arising on 
irrecoverable loans, it would appear that the mere fact that a 
loan has been written off is not sufficient for it to have been 
"actually incurred". It would appear that the courts will 
require more substantive evidence that the loan is, in fact, 
irrecoverable. The mere aversion by a taxpayer to persue its 
legal right of recourse, for whatever reason is, therefore, 
insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the amount is so 
deductible. In this regard, an analogy can be drawn to the 
provisions of Section ll(i), which Section permits the deduction 
of bad debts. One of the conditions precedent for such a 
deduction to be granted is that the debt must be proved bad to 
the satisfaction of the Commissioner. Thus, the mere opinion of 
the taxpayer is insufficient. 
I ■ 
110 
In ITC 1327 2 , the taxpayer made a loan to a private company 
controlled by him and, in addition, guaranteed certain debts. 
Following a compromise sanctioned by the court after the company 
had been put into judicial management, the taxpayer was released 
from the guarantees given, provided he waived his claim against 
the company. The taxpayer sought to deduct the loss of the loan 
resulting from his waiver of claim against the company. 
In considering whether the taxpayer had incurred the loss, 
albeit via a voluntary waiver of the claim, the court found that 
he had actually incurred a loss. In coming to this conclusion, 
the court noted that had the taxpayer not waived this right the 
company would have gone into compulsory liquidation and the 
taxpay~r would have been called upon to honour his guarantees 
thereby putting at risk his whole estate. The court held: 
"If, in order to save himself from ruin, or even in less 
extravagant terms, save himself having to pay four or five 
times the amount in question, a taxpayer abandons his 
right to that amount, (the loan) it can legitimately, in 
my view, be discussed as an involuntary loss." 
The judgement emphasized the fact that the potential loss to be 
suffered by the taxpayer if the loan was not waived was greatly 
in excess of the amount actually waived. It would appear, based 
on the decisions in Cathcart and ITC 1138 supra, that the courts 
will only consider a voluntary waiver under circumstances 
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similar to those in ITC 1327. 'Where a taxpayer cannot show such 
a waiver is commercially sensible, then it is unlikely that the 
courts will follow this approach, instead requiring that the 
taxpayer prove that a loan is, in fact, irrecoverable. 
3.4 TIME AND QUANTIFICATION OF LOSS 
Regarding the time at which losses are actually incurred and the 
quantification of the loss, the Courts stated in ITC 1284 1 that, 
in quoting from New Zealand Flax Investments v FCOT (1938) 61 
COR 179 at 207: 
"Incurred does not mean only defrayed, discharged or borne 
but rather includes encountered, run into or fallen upon. 
It is unsafe to attempt exhaustive definitions of a 
concept intended to have such a various or multivarious 
application. But it does not include a loss or 
expenditure which is no more than impending, threatened or 
expected." 
Thus, the mere fact that the extent of a loss cannot be 
quantified at the year end but only the fact that such a loss 
has been incurred, will nevertheless require that the date of 
incurral and quantification of this loss is the year in which it 
is incurred, and not necessarily quantified (for example, the 
insolvency of a debtor will indicate a loss has been incurred 
even though it may only be quantified in the future). 
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1. NATURE OF ADVANCES MADE 
A common thread which links many of the cases discussed is the analogy 
drawn between a banker's or money lender's floating capital, and the 
stock in trade of an ordinary merchant. The purpose of this part is 
to consider these comments and to examine the nature of the right 
acquired by a money lender, being the right to receive the repayment 
of moneys advanced, in order to ascertain whether this right would be 
correctly classified as "trading stock". 
In Meyerowitz and Spiro on Income Tax I the authors state: 
"In the case of the banker or money lender the loan or advance 
constitutes circulating capital or stock in trade ... " 
In ITC 257 2 the court, in contemplating the deductibility of losses 
incurred on promissory notes issued by the taxpayer commented that 
"the main question .... is whether this promissory note can be regarded 
as a portion of the stock in trade ... " 
Further, in Salisbury Board of Executors Limited's case 3 Blakeway J, 
in commenting on the appellant's argument, stated 
" .. . it was suggested that a money lender is entitled to regard 
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the money lent by him as his stock in trade ... " 
Although the court did not find it necessary to decide on this issue, 
it is important to note that they used the word "regard" as opposed to 
"treat" or such a similar word. 
The importance of the distinction is thus: 
o In the event of a loan due to a taxpayer proving irrecoverable, 
or declining in value, and such a loan is "trading stock" as 
defined in Section 1 of the Act, then Section 22(1) permits the 
taxpayer to reduce the value of the closing stock where it has· 
been "diminished by reason of damage, deterioration, change in 
fashion, decrease in the market value or.for any other reason", 
subject to a discretion granted to the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue. Thus, ~he_ "write down" permitted in terms of Section 
22 would allow a money lender to value loans due to it at the 
end of each year, and to claim as a tax deduction losses 
anticipated in that year of assessment if the loans were trading 
stock; or 
o If the debts due are not.properly classifiable as trading stock, 
any anticipated decline in value will be regarded as a provision 
and therefore not claimable as a loss until the loss is clearly 
incurred, as discussed in Part IV. In this regard, Section 




2. TRADING STOCK 
Trading stock is defined in Section 1 of the Act as follows: 
"'Trading stock' includes anything produced, manufactured, 
purchased or in any other manner acquired by a taxpayer for 
purposes of manufacture, sale or exchange by him or on his 
behalf, or the proceeds from the disposal of which forms or will 
form part of his gross income." 
The above provision was discussed in De Beers' case 1 wherein Corbett 
JA stated the following: 
"The definition falls naturally into two parts: 
( 1) Anything produced, manufactured, purchased or in any other 
manner acquired by a taxpayer for purposes of manufacture, 
sale or exchange by him or on his behalf, or 
(2) Anything the proceeds from the disposal of which forms or 
will form part of his gross income." 
In applying the above to loans, it would appear in the first instance 
that part (2) would not apply, as, by definition, a taxpayer does not 
generally dispose of funds advanced (even though it may part with 
ownership) to a borrower (see Part VII). A loan of money does not 
constitute a disposal but merely the temporary parting of the funds, 
namely a 'mutuum'. 
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In contemplating the first consideration, it would appear that a loan 
could not be regarded as anything "produced, manufactured or 
purchased". On the other hand, a loan could clearly be regarded as 
"anything ... acquired by a taxpayer"; the asset acquired being the 
right to demand repayment of moneys due, together with quid pro quo 
for the advance, in terms of a contract. Conceptually, this contract 
could be disposed of or traded by the taxpayer. (In this regard, 
certain loan agreements, being debentures or stock (in the financial 
sense) are traded on a stock exchange). However, in the normal course 
of events such a right would not have been acquired for the "purposes 
of manufacture, sale or exchange by him ... " (unless the individual 
circumstances indicate the contrary). Thus, it would appear that 
loans made by money lenders would not be correctly classifiable as 
"trading stock", for income tax purposes. 
3. CONCLUSION 
It therefore appears that the courts, in referring to "stock in trade" 
were describing the attitude, or intention, with which a money lender 
views its floating capital. In the ordinary sense, a merchant views 
its stock in trade as something which it holds temporarily only to 
dispose of at the earliest opportunity and thereby earn a profit. 
Similarly, a money lender would view capital raised as an asset to be 
parted with at the earliest opportunity (subject to interest rates 
payable and security provided) in order to maximise its profitability. 
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IN THE PRODUCTION OF INCOME 
A further condition to be met by losses in order to be deductible, is that 
losses incurred arose through a transaction entered into "in the production 
of the income". 1 
In discussing the term, Watermeyer AJP 2 stated the following: 
"Now, as pointed out ... , income is produced by the performance of a 
series of acts, and attendant upon them are expenses. Such expenses 
are deductible expenses, providing they are so closely linked to such 
acts as to be regarded as part of the cost of performing them. 
A little reflection will show that two questions arise (a) whether the 
act, to which the expenditure is attached, is performed in the 
production of income, and (b) whether expenditure is linked to it 
closely enough ... " 
It is considered that the above comments are equally applicable in the case 
of losses 3 
Thus, the first question to address is whether the act (the lending of the 
money) to which the loss (expenditure) is attached, is performed in the 
production of income. 
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Typically, for such a loss to be considered in the production of income, the 
taxpayer would need to be in a position to show that the loans were advanced 
to earn income, either of the nature of interest or allied income, or income 
via another means, for example by a shipper providing its clients with 
finance, thereby enabling it to earn its normal form of income. 
Thus, in ITC 44 4 a taxpayer who guaranteed certain obligations by a third. 
party contractor, in the hope of obtaining work from the contractor, had to 
fund these guarantees when the contractor's business failed. The court, in 
finding against the taxpayer's claim to deduct the losses incurred, concluded 
that as "the guarantee involved an undertaking to complete the building if 
the contractor failed to do so, and this was an operation entirely outside 
the scope of the company's objects ... ". It was therefore a loss or outgoing 
incurred not in the production of the income of the company. 
Thus, the court in this instance found ~hat the link between the guarantees 
given, and the company's ordinary activities was not linked to the income the 
company would have ordinarily made in the course of its operations. 
With regard to the second question, that is whether the loss (expenditure) 
is linked to the income closely enough, Watermeyer AJP went on to state: 
"Now, at first, it would appear that only acts necessary to earn the 
income and expenditure necessarily attendant upon such act should be 
deducted; but this is not so. As pointed out ... , businesses are 
conducted by different persons in different ways. The purpose of the 
act entailing expenditure must be looked to. If it is performed for 
the purpose of earning income, then the expenditure attendant upon it 
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is deductible." 5 
Thus, in applying the above to ITC 44 supra, the court found that the losses 
arising through the guarantees given were to remote to the income earning 
operations of the company for them to be considered a part thereof. 
Similarly, in ITC 1009 6 the court found that a loan advanced to a social 
club by a taxpayer who was a member of that club, who carried on the business 
of money lending, could not be considered as a part of that business as the 
loan was not entered into in order to produce income; as such, the loan could 
not be regarded as being advanced in the production of income. 
In ITC 1009 supra 1 the court noted that ~wo criteria were to be considered 
in determining the deductibility of losses incurred on irrecoverable loans. 
These criteria are: 
o Did the taxpayer carry on a business of money lending; 
o If so, was the loan in question made as a part of that business. 
Thus, the first question to be addressed is: were the funds advanced fixed 
or floating capital; 
If floating capital was so used the second question to be addressed was, was 
the loan made in the production of income, being income generated 'through the 
business of money lending. 
In Cathcart' case 8 the taxpayer, being an architect, gave certain guarantees 
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on premises erected by him. The owner of the premises claimed damages and 
in order to avoid the unpleasantness of legal action, the taxpayer agreed to 
settle the claim. The court, in finding against the taxpayer's claim for a 
deduction of the losses incurred, stated: 
"That the giving of a guarantee in order to secure employment as an 
architect could be regarded as an undertaking for the purposes of 
earning income; but that in the absence of evidence that the 
guarantees were necessarily met, the taxpayer failed to discharge the 
onus of establishing that the amounts paid by him had been wholly and 
exclusively expended in the production of his income". 
In this instance Cathcart failed to show that there was a necessary and 
direct link between the expenditure incurred and the income earned. 
Similarly, where there is no direct link between the granting of credit and 
the earning of income, subsequent losses will not be permitted as a deduction 
as they were not advanced either in "the production of the (taxpayer's) 
income", or were not advanced "wholly and exclusively for the purposes of 
trade". 9 (In this regard, Watermeyer AJP commented in Port Elizabeth 
Electric Tramway Company Limited's case 10 that what Section ll(a) provided 
positively, Section 23(g) provided negatively.) 
A further aspect which requires consideration would be the eventuality 
occasionally confronted by money lenders wherein it is apparent to them that 
they need to advance further funds to a debtor in order to protect that 
debtor from bankruptcy. Under these circumstances it could be argued tnat 
the funds advanced were not advanced in the production of income but to 




incurred in order to protect a taxpayer's (floating) capital base. 
For example, in ITC 585 11 a. landlord incurred certain costs in resisting an 
action brought by his tennants to reduce their rentals, which action was 
successful. In attempting to deduct this expenditure, the court found that 
the legal expenses in no way added to or increased the taxpayer's income but 
merely had the effect of protecting it and preventing it from diminishing. 
As such, it did not constitute expenditure incurred in the production of 
income. 
A contrary conclusion may be found in Stellebosch Farmers' Winery's case 12 , 
which case concerned the deductibility of legal expenses incurred in opposing 
the registration of a trade mark by a competitor where the taxpayer felt such 
registration would adversely affect its turnover. The courts stated at 391 
that: 
"The main purpose of the expenditure was not to protect its (the 
trademarks) design but to oust the rival competition and so maintain 
and increase its profits, and in carrying out this object it incurred 
legal costs it now seeks to deduct." 
In considering the· above two actions, it is clear that the courts have 
recognised that the expenditure incurred merely to protect income is not 
deductible, whereas expenditure incurred in order to enhance the income 
earning ability of a taxpayer is. 
It would, notwithstanding the above, be clear that it is within the 




advanced will prove bad. Secondly, a money lender should expect to be 
confronted by circumstances wherein it is faced with the choice of either 
liquidating a debtor and thereby ensuring a loss is realised, or advancing 
further funds in the hope of enabling that debtor to resuscitate its affairs 
and pay back not only the original debt, but the fresh moneys advanced. The 
actual event elected would logically be based on the assessment by the money 
lender as to the ability of the borrower to so resuscitate its affairs. If 
this is likely income will be anticipated on both new funds advanced and 
existing debts; if this is unlikely, then the money lender may well elect to 
liquidate the borrower. (These moneys may take the form of a new loan, a 
deferral of interest payments or the like.) 
As such an eventuality is likely, it would appear that the deduction of 
losses incurred on funds advanced to resuscitate debtors would be loans 
advanced in both the production of income, with the overriding expectation 
that additional income (on the new loans advanced) will be produced as well 
as enabling existing loans to continue to produce income. Furthermore, if 
it were to be contemplated that such advances were to protect a taxpayer's 
income earning ability, the fact that these advances were protecting floating 
capital rather than fixed capital would similarly indicate their revenue 
nature. As such, it is considered that such advances (subject to the other 
conditions discussed) would be deductible for tax purposes. 
■ ■ i 
PART VII SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
1. CREATION OF LOAN ACCOUNT 









During the body of this analysis on the tax nature of losses incurred on 
loans, the concept of two types of loans was alluded to. Specifically, these 
types are: 
o Loans advanced to borowers wherein the lender intends to seek a return 
through the repayment of the loan together with a profit in the form 
of interest or the like; or 
o Loans advanced to third parties, typically companies owned by the 
lender, wherein the lender intends to sell the shares of the company 
together with the loans accounts, in order to realise a profit on the 
sale of the two. In this instance, the lender may have no intention 
of requesting the borrower to repay the amounts loaned; the contrary 
has often been the case wherein it has been clearly acknowledged that 
the borrower is unlikely to be called upon by the lender to repay such 
amounts. 
Notwithstanding the above distinction the courts have looked upon the strict 
juristic nature of such a loan and considered the nature of the funds 
advanced in the taxpayer's hands, rather than the taxpayer's intended use 
with the asset (being the loan) created. 
Examples of the first type of loan would include those discussed in Stone's 




In discussing this distinction, Goldstone JA commented in Burman's case 3 • 
"There are two points of distinction between the facts of the present 
case and those in Stone's case. In the latter case the capital 
amounts of the loans were intended to be repaid to the lender directly 
by the borrower. In the present case the intention was that the 
capital amounts of the loans would be recouped by means of payment in 
shares in the public company and the immediate resale of those 
shares ... It appears to be these distinctions which have lead Nicholas 
AJA to the conclusion that the loans in a case such as the present 
were: 
'A component, together with a shareholding, of the members interest in 
the company' . 
That approach, in my respectful opinion, ignores the commercial 
reality and legal consequences of the loans made by Burman ... At all 
times the borrowers of the moneys were Burman's debtors and must have 
been so regarded by him ... " 
In further commenting on the decision in ITC 1344, which case concerned 
similar facts with an opposite conclusion being reached, Goldstone JA 
concluded: 
"The decision in that case is only explicable upon the agreed facts 







'It was at all relevant times his intention to sell the said shares 
and loan accounts as soon as the development was completed with a view 
to making a profit' . 
The intention expressed was that the shares as well as the loan 
accounts would indeed be sold at a profit" . 
. In comparing the above two quotes, it is clear that the courts placed 
emphasis on the following factors: 
o The legal nature of loans owing to a taxpayer; and 
0 The intention with which that loan was held. In this regard, 
Goldstone JA emphasised that "at all times the borrowers of the moneys 
were Burman's debtors and must have been so regarded by him" 4 
It would therefore appear that one of the fundamental enquiries into the 
nature of a loan, as discussed in Part II, is the intention with which that 
loan is held or acquired. Thus, where a taxpayer advances funds to a third 
party without a clear intention to merge the loans so advanced with another 
asset (for example shares issued by the debtor) then the courts will presume 
that the loans are separate and distinct from that asset. In this regard, 
there would appear to be three instances under which a merging of shares and 
loan accounts into a single tradeable entity could arise. These are: 
o Instances where the taxpayer is in a position to show a clear 











discussed in ITC 1344; or 
o Where the fusion of the two assets is achieved through contract. 
Examples of such a transaction can be found on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange wherein certain property companies have shares linked to 
variable rate loans. Under these circumstances, the sale of a share 
necessitates the sale of the loan account. Similarly, the purchaser 
has no choice but to buy both assets; or 
o Where shares and loan accounts are linked by statute. For example, in 
the case of companies registered in terms of the Share Blocks Control 
Act 5 , the seller of shares is obliged to sell or cede, amongst other 
things, his loan obligation. 
In the case of a taxpayer selling loans due it under the circumstances 
envisaged, a further two scenarios can be contemplated. Firstly, where the 
taxpayer creates that loan account, as did Burman, or where the taxpayer 
acquires that loan account by purchasing it from the taxpayer . 
1. CREATION OF LOAN ACCOUNT 
In Burman's case 2 the taxpayer advanced moneys to a company in which 
he held shares, in order to enable that company to develop certain 
properties. The taxpayer then intended to sell his shares and loan 
accounts to a listed company in exchange for shares in it, which 
shares were. to be sold to the public in exchange for cash. 






separate and distinct from the shares, and resultant losses on the 
disposal of these loans represented losses of fixed capital and were 
not therefore deductible for income tax purposes. 
This principle now seems clearly entrenched in our law with the 
exception of the circumstances noted in ITC 1344 2 • This case, which 
concerned similar facts to Burman's case with the difference being 
that the taxpayer and the Revenue authorities agreed that the taxpayer 
entered into the loan transaction with the clear intention of selling 
the loans as a part of the whole. Thus, where a taxpayer can 
discharge such a burden of proof the taxpayer may be able to persuade 
the courts to reach a conclusion different to that reached in Burman's 
case supra. 
On the other hand, circumstances can be envisaged where developers 
similar to Burman create loan accounts with the clear intention of 
selling them at a loss. For example, the developer of a timeshare 
unit using a share block company will sell its shares and loan 
accounts to the public, with each share and loan obligatipn entitling 
the purchaser to the use of that property as stipulated in the "use 
agreement". The timeshare developer may either, voluntarily or out of 
necessity, sell certain timeshare weeks at a loss, whilst selling 
others at a profit. For example, weeks in peak holiday periods would 
attract a premium, whilst those in off peak times may well be sold at 
a discount. The cost of actually constructing the unit to be sold 
would be independent of the price which could be obtained by the 
selling of a use of that unit at various times of the year and, as 






others would generated a sizeable profit. 
Under these circum,stances, the loans and the share accounts of the 
time share developer could be regarded as its "stock in trade" (see 
Part V). 
In discussing losses incurred by a taxpayer intentionally through its 
trading activities Corbett JA noted in De Beers's 
case 6 the following: 
"Of course, the attainment of a profit is not necessarily the 
hallmark of a trading transaction. A trader may for commercial 
reason be compelled to resell goods at a loss. Conceivably also 
he may elect to resale goods at a loss in order to gain some 
other commercial advantage for his business. The practice of 
putting on sale the so-called 'loss leaders' by some merchants 
would fall into this category; and there seems little doubt that 
the merchandise so sold would constitute .stock in trade and the 
proceeds thereof gross income." 
Although the assertion that losses made on the sale of loans would be 
disallowable for the reasons enunciated in Burman's case supra, it 
would appear arguable that parties who entered into transactions 
wherein loans are advanced to companies and the shares and loan 
accounts sold in some instances intentionally at a loss, and in others 
with a view to making a profit, could be viewed as using their elected 






that the losses intentionally incurred would be deductible for tax 
purposes. A contrary conclusion would not only be inequitous but 
contrary to the generally accepted method in which the Income Tax Act 
is to be applied wherein "normal" trading expenditure and losses are 
deducted from income derived. 
It is noted that the example of time share developers clearly reflects 
instances where loans can be sold intentionally at a loss. It would, 
notwithstanding this, appear that other types of property developers 
may be hard pressed to prove such an intention exists where they 
embark on a scheme wherein property is developed by a company owned by 
them and shares and loan accounts are merely to be sold, as was 
Burman's intention. 
2. ACQUISITION OF SHARES AND LOAN ACCOUNT 
Where parties, other than the lender in the first instance, acquire 
loan accounts (either linked or unlinked to shares) it would appear 
that the courts will view the transaction in a different light to 
instances where loan accounts are created by the debtor. For example, 
in B.S.A. Company Investment Limited's case 7 the court considered 
certain losses incurred by the taxpayer when the taxpayer acquired a 
portfolio of investments, one of which was a loan the taxpayer knew 
would not realise the purchase price paid. 
taxpayer the court commented: 
In finding for the 
"So long as the goods purchased are goods which form part of a 





of being disposed of in the course of his normal trade, the 
motives which prompted the trader to purchase that stock in 
trade are irrelevant ... " 
In this case, the court identifies the difference between loans 
arising through advances made by a taxpayer, and loans acquired by a 
taxpayer. A similar conclusion was reached in an Australian case, XCo 
(Pty) Limited 8 , wherein loans were acquired at a discount with 
subsequent profits being taxed. 
In the first instance, and as previously discussed, loans arising 
through advances made by a taxpayer cannot be viewed as "trading 
stock" as defined, whereas loans acquired, providing they meet the 
criteria identified in that definition, may be viewed as trading 
stock. As such, where loans are acquired with the intention to trade 
with them, they may be properly viewed as trading stock, with the 
provisions of Section 22 of the Act applying. 
Notwithstanding the above, where loans are inextricably linked to 
shares (or any other asset) through statute or contract, then the 
above conclusion would be reinforced, with the two assets taking on 
the identity of trading stock, if applicable. 
It would, therefore, appear acceptable for a taxpayer to contend that 
losses arising as a result of loans acquired by that taxpayer from 
third party lenders will be losses of a revenue nature, rather than 
losses of its fixed capital, where a trading intention can be clearly 












the taxpayer can clearly identify the asset acquired as being separate 
and distinct from its fixed capital whereas loans made by the taxpayer 
arise from that fixed capital and are not therefore separate. 
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